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Executive Summary 
Yet another ‘final’ Northern Ireland deadline came and went, but this time devolution 
looked set, at last, to be restored 55 months after it collapsed in October 2002, 
following revelations of an IRA spy ring at Stormont.  
 
It was evident that devolution would not return until and unless the ambiguous 
relationship between Sinn Féin and the rule of law was resolved. After the belated 
announcement of an end to the IRA campaign in 2005 and associated 
decommissioning, the remaining step was to endorse the institutions of policing and 
justice in Northern Ireland, reformed following the Belfast agreement of 1998, as set 
out in the St Andrews agreement of October 2006. This duly took place at a special 
ard fheis (conference) called by SF in January 2007. 
 
The ball was then in the court of the Democratic Unionist Party, whose electoral 
strength had advanced in lock-step with that of SF as Protestant insecurity grew 
since the ‘peace process’ began in the early 1990s. A combination of inducements in 
the St Andrews agreement—notably provision for deadlocking vetoes and the 
separation of the conjoined first and deputy first minister—and the threat of joint, 
British-Irish ‘stewardship’ over Northern Ireland impelled the DUP towards 
acceptance of a loveless marriage with SF. 
 
The two parties duly prevailed in the assembly election on 7 March, eclipsing the 
former custodians of what passes for the centre ground in Northern Ireland, the UUP 
and the SDLP. A pre-election poll highlighted the sheer contempt of most Northern 
Ireland citizens for the politicians of the other ‘side’ and scepticism as to whether they 
could work together. 
 
Despite the repeated insistence by ministers in London and Dublin that a devolved 
government must be formed by 26 March, or the assembly would be disbanded and 
MLAs put out of work, the DUP was able to spare its blushes and ease internal 
unrest by securing a postponement to 8 May. Meantime, however, there was another 
‘historic’ Northern Ireland media moment to sustain momentum, with an appearance 
(almost) together at Stormont by the DUP leader, Rev Ian Paisley, and the SF 
president, Gerry Adams.  
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Soon thereafter, the parties indicatively divided the spoils by running the d’Hondt 
rule: the departments were distributed four to the DUP, three to SF, two to the Ulster 
Unionist Party and one to the SDLP. A bulging in-tray of controversial issues will 
confront the new ministers, including the future of academic selection, legislation on 
the Irish language and water charges. 
 
The question remained as to whether the new leaders would become immersed in 
these practical problems and thrash out solutions together, or whether they would 
see them as trials of strength in the continuing ethnic power-struggle over their 
opposing ultimate constitutional goals. 
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Chronology of Key Events 
22 January 2007  Police ombudsman releases damning report on collusion over 
several years between old RUC Special Branch and loyalist 
paramilitaries in north Belfast. 
28  January  2007  Sinn Féin special conference gives support to policing and 
criminal justice system in Northern Ireland, conditional on 
restoration of power-sharing institutions and devolution of 
policing and justice. 
30 January 2007  Independent Monitoring Commission welcomes SF conference 
decision as further evidence that republican leadership 
committed to democratic process. 
7 March 2007  Third assembly election takes place under STV, revealing over 
subsequent days of count continued polarisation as 
Democratic Unionist Party and SF dominate. 
12  March  2007  Another report from IMC underscores commitment of 
republican movement to political path. 
26  March  2007  Deadline set by Northern Ireland secretary, Peter Hain, for 
‘devolution or dissolution’ expires without formation of power-
sharing executive, but he elects to introduce emergency 
legislation allowing of a delay until 8 May, following successful 
weekend negotiations involving two largest parties, leading to 
joint news conference at Stormont. 
27 March 2007  The DUP’s MEP, Jim Allister, resigns from the party in protest. 
2 April 2007  DUP and SF agree to indicative running of d’Hondt rule, so that 
parties can prepare to run particular departments in interim: 
election result gives DUP four seats (as well as first minister), 
SF three (as well as deputy first minister), Ulster Unionist Party 
two and SDLP one. The ministers were named over the 
succeeding days and weeks. 
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1.   The ‘Peace Process’     
Rick Wilford and Robin Wilson 
1.1 Introduction 
The pivot on which this report turns is, of course, the (third) assembly election on 7 
March 2007, which was intended to lead to the nomination of a new, inclusive, 
power-sharing administration on 26 March. As the electorate (more accurately, 
around two-thirds of it) trooped to the polls, however, there remained uncertainty 
about whether that deadline would be met—notwithstanding repeated statements by 
the Northern Ireland secretary, Peter Hain, the republic’s minister for foreign affairs, 
Dermot Ahern, and the London and Dublin premiers, insisting that if no Executive 
Committee was established by the due date ‘Plan B’ would take effect. The assembly 
would be dissolved and the two governments would thereafter engage, under direct 
rule, in the ‘joint stewardship’ of Northern Ireland.  
 
The timetable for the election and putative post-election developments was set by the 
St Andrews agreement of October 2006,
1 and their context shaped by further reports 
from the Independent Monitoring Commission (on 30 January and 12 March) and, 
crucially, Sinn Féin’s special ard fheis (conference) on policing in Dublin on 28 
January. Each of the IMC’s reports confirmed that the IRA had dismantled its 
operational structures, was not engaging in acts of violence, was not employing 
criminal methods to raise funds and was no longer ‘exiling’ from Northern Ireland 
those it deemed miscreants—and that its commitment to the strategy of a political 
path to Irish unification was firm and undiminished. As the more recent of the two 
reports concluded, ‘it is firmly committed to the political path … terrorism and 




1.2  SF and the rule of law  
The IMC’s reports were in some measure influenced by the ard fheis of 28 January, 
at which SF delegates supported overwhelmingly the motion tabled by the party’s ard 
                                                  
1 See R. Wilford and R. Wilson, Northern Ireland Devolution Monitoring Report: January 2007, at: 
www.ucl.ac.uk/constitution-unit/research/devolution/MonReps/NI_Jan07.pdf, pp. 21-7. 
2 Independent Monitoring Commission, Fourteenth Report of the Independent Monitoring Commission 
(London: HMSO, 2007, at: 
www.independentmonitoringcommission.org/documents/uploads/14th_IMC_Report.pdf), p. 11. 
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chomhairle (executive) expressing its ‘critical’ support for ‘civic policing through a 
police service which is representative of the community it serves, free from partisan 
political control and democratically accountable’.
3 In addition to support for the Police 
Service of Northern Ireland (and the Garda Síochána), the motion also expressed 
support for the criminal justice system, authorised SF’s elected representatives to 
participate in the Policing Board and the district policing partnerships, endorsed the 
devolution of policing and criminal justice (by no later than May 2008, the date 
specified at St Andrews) and actively encouraged all in the community ‘to co-operate 
fully with the police services (north and south) in tackling crime and actively 
supporting all criminal justice institutions’.  
 
The path-breaking motion was, however, a conditional one. Its coda made plain that 
the motion would only be implemented by the SF executive ‘when the power-sharing 
institutions are established and when the Ard Chomhairle is satisfied that the policing 
and criminal justice powers will be transferred. Or if this does not happen within the 
St Andrews timeframe, only when acceptable new partnership arrangements to 
implement the Good Friday Agreement are in place.’
4
 
There had been some fancy footwork by ministers in advance of the ard fheis, with a 
view to smoothing the path for the SF leadership. The DUP fancied it had a veto over 
the devolution of policing and justice, since it could block a cross-community request 
in the assembly for the transfer of these functions, but this is a sine qua non of 
progress for SF. The Northern Ireland secretary, Mr Hain, told the assembly policing 
and justice committee that it would be a ‘constitutional nonsense’ for him to impose a 
minister on the assembly if there was no inter-party agreement on the devolution of 
these two functions by May 2008. But he said something very like that in indicating 




In February, the government was to table an amendment to the Justice and Security 
(Northern Ireland) Bill for devolution of policing and justice. This would allow the 
secretary of state to impose the structure of a single minister, with a ‘transitional’ 
deputy minister—a fudge between the unionist goal of one (unionist) minister and the 
                                                  
3 The motion is long: the full text is at www.sinnfeinonline.com/news/3189.  
4 ibid. 
5 C. Thornton, Hain will be able to name justice minister’, Belfast Telegraph (10 January 2007). 
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nationalist alternative of a co-equal duo—if there were no agreement among the 
parties by May 2008.
6
 
The prime minister, Tony Blair, also sought to save SF’s blushes over involvement 
with a police service which the party has claimed to be in the service of ‘securocrats’ 
out to get it. In the Commons he affirmed that MI5 would be separate from what the 
SF president, Gerry Adams, has come to call ‘civic policing’, though there would be 
‘liaison’ between them. His spokesperson was vague when later pressed on how this 
corresponded with the ‘integrated’ arrangements affirmed in Annex E of the St 
Andrews agreement
7—integration which the republicans believe they have stopped.
8
 
A key former member of the Patten commission which devised the post-agreement 
policing reforms, Maurice Hayes, was rather less sanguine about what ‘civic policing’ 
might mean than Mr Blair could afford to be from the distance of Westminster. 
Fearing it implied a police service which did not arrest anybody and had no 
intelligence capacity to tackle organised crime—the latter a major public concern in 




Such concerns were exacerbated by news that the Assets Recovery Agency, which 
has pursued paramilitary-linked wealth, was to be dissolved into the Serious 
Organised Crime Agency
10—particularly when it emerged that the news had broken 
in south Armagh days earlier, leading to concern that the ARA could have been a 
pawn in secret negotiations between SF and the government, with the prospect of 
pressure being lifted on the former IRA chief of staff Thomas ‘Slab’ Murphy, whose 
assets have been under investigation by the agency.
11 The chief constable 




These concerns were however allayed when the ARA issued a statement saying it 
had succeeded in a High Court application to freeze £11.8 million worth of property in 
                                                  
6 M. Hookham, ‘Hain will have control of new justice body’, Belfast Telegraph (7 February 2007). 
7 F. Millar, ‘Blair rules out MI5 role in civic policing in NI’, Irish Times (11 January 2007). 
8 G. Moriarty, ‘Sinn Féin and SDLP clash over statement on MI5’, Irish Times (11 January 2007). 
9 M. Hayes, ‘No North political party should accept soft core “civic policing”’, Irish Independent (15 
January 2007). 
10 A. Travis, ‘Agency which targeted criminals’ assets to be axed’, Guardian (12 January 2007). 
11 H. McDonald, ‘Downing Street accused of pandering to Sinn Fein’, Observer (14 January 2007). 
12 C. Thornton, ‘Parties question motive behind abolition of assets recovery body’, Belfast Telegraph (15 
January 2007). 
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Manchester associated with the inquiry into monies allegedly generated from Mr 
Murphy’s enterprises.
13 In a written Commons answer, a junior Home Office minister, 
Vernon Coaker, told Gregory Campbell of the DUP that the merger with SOCA would 
not diminish the asset-recovery effort in Northern Ireland.
14 Mr Hain also secured a 
letter of comfort from the home secretary, John Reid, to that effect.
15  
 
After a further ARA success, in which £8.2 million of assets—including 36 houses 
and plots of land and 11 bank accounts—were seized, belonging to the brothers of 
an alleged fuel smuggler in south Armagh,
16 Alan McQuillan, deputy ARA director, 
expressed cautious optimism about the merger.
17 Mr McQuillan was subsequently 
named acting director, pending the merger; welcoming his appointment, the junior 
Northern Ireland Office minister Paul Goggins once more insisted there would be ‘no 
diminution’ in tackling organised crime in the region.
18
 
The IMC’s thirteenth report appeared two days after the SF ard fheis, commending 
the outcome as ‘a very major development’. It continued: ‘That decision and the 
efforts invested by the leadership of the republican movement in presenting the 
arguments in favour of the change were further substantial evidence of their 
commitment to the democratic process.’
19 Ironically, less than a fortnight earlier, SF 
had been denied in a court ruling a judicial review of the role of the IMC, which it had 
all along insisted was part of the ‘securocrat’ agenda.
20
 
Mr Hain seized on the IMC report and the ard fheis outcome. Of the latter, he said 
that ‘what had always been a massive impediment to stable and lasting government 
has been removed’ and that the way was now clear for the restoration of devolution. 
It was a message reinforced by his reaction to the former, of which he said that ‘this 
report is further proof, if proof is needed, that Northern Ireland is a much different 
place to what it was only 18 months ago. It is now up to the politicians to show 
courage and grasp the historic opportunities before them in the coming weeks.’
21
 
                                                  
13 ARA news release, 18 January 2007. 
14 M. Hookham, ‘Assets recovery costs us a fortune’, Belfast Telegraph (27 January 2007). 
15 Northern Ireland Office news release, 12 February 2007. 
16 ARA news release, 5 March 2007. 
17 BBC News Online (6 March 2007). 
18 NIO news release, 16 March 2007. 
19 Independent Monitoring Commission, Thirteenth Report of the Independent Monitoring Commission 
(London: HMSO, 2007, at: www.independentmonitoringcommission.org/documents/uploads/Thirteenth 
per cent20Report.pdf).  
20 ‘SF refused permission for judicial review of IMC’, Belfast Telegraph (19 January 2007). 
21 NIO news releases, 28 and 30 January 2007. 
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Hailed in London and Dublin as, respectively ‘an historic’ and a ‘landmark’ decision, 
and by the leaders of the UUP and the SDLP as inevitable and long-overdue, even 
Sammy Wilson of the DUP acknowledged that the republican movement ‘had taken a 
step forward’. But he also insisted that the acid test for SF was ‘delivery’ of its 
commitment—a term that became a constant DUP refrain before, during and after 
the election campaign.  
 
Behind all the thunder over policing, another related issue referred to in reports over 
the past year continued to bubble away under the surface: the status of ‘community 
restorative justice’ schemes, established as an alternative to paramilitary 
‘punishment’ attacks on those deemed guilty (in the absence, of course, of due 
process) of ‘anti-social behaviour’ and drug-dealing. A protocol to give official 
legitimacy to such schemes, following the ending of private support from an Irish-
American funder, had been the subject of prolonged controversy, as other parties 
expressed concern at the light-touch regulation originally envisaged, which would not 
even have required the schemes to co-operate directly with the police—as the 
‘republican’ schemes in particular had refused to do.  
 
In February, the NIO security minister, David Hanson, published the final version of 
the restorative-justice protocol, claiming it ‘has the police at the centre of the 
process’.
22 It is much tighter than the initial proposals, but the SDLP said it was still 
unhappy about the ‘culture of paramilitary control’ associated with the schemes.
23
1.3 Collusion 
As if the issue of policing wasn’t difficult enough, the publication by the police 
ombudsman’s office of its report
24 into the death of Raymond McCord in north Belfast 
in 1997 reignited the charge of collusion between the old Royal Ulster Constabulary 
and loyalist paramilitaries, more specifically between Special Branch officers and the 
Ulster Volunteer Force in that area of the city.  
 
The report supplied a sobering glimpse into a very dark corner of the dirty war that 
extended far beyond the murder of Mr McCord, covering the period 1991-2003. It 
said that during those years UVF informants were responsible for 10 murders 
                                                  
22 NIO news release, 5 February 2007. 
23 D. Keenan, ‘Protocols will lead to rough justice, says SDLP’, Irish Times (6 February 2007). 
24 Police Ombudsman for Northern Ireland, Statement by the Police Ombudsman for Northern Ireland on 
her investigation into the circumstances surrounding the death of Raymond McCord Junior and related 
matters, Belfast, 22 January 2007, at: 
www.policeombudsman.org/press.cfm?Press_ID=153&action=detail&year=2007&month=4. 
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(including that of Mr McCord), 10 attempted murders, 10 ‘punishment’ shootings, 13 
‘punishment’ beatings, a bomb attack across the border in Monaghan, and 72 other 
instances of serious crime, including drug-dealing, extortion, intimidation and criminal 
damage.  
 
According to the report, one UVF informant, known to be Mark Haddock—currently 
serving 10 years for his part in an assault—received almost £80,000 for his work as 
an informer, and he and his fellow informants were protected by some Special 
Branch handlers from other RUC officers investigating the relevant crimes. The 
report, which also alleged that the informants were implicated in up to five further 
murders, upheld the complaint of Mr McCord’s father that ‘over a number of years 
police acted in such a way as to protect informants from being fully accountable to 
the law’ and that ‘junior officers [within Special Branch] could not have operated as 
they did without the knowledge and support at the highest levels of the RUC and 
PSNI’. 
 
The police ombudsman, Nuala O’Loan, insisted that a ‘culture of subservience’ to 
Special Branch had developed within the RUC—a charge made back in the 1980s by 
Sir John Stalker, following his investigation of alleged ‘shoot-to-kill’ episodes 
involving the RUC
25—and that this had created a ‘form of dysfunction’. The effect was 
that ‘whilst SB officers were effective in preventing bombings, shootings and other 
attacks, some informants were able to continue to engage in terrorist activities, 
including murder, without CID having the ability to deal with them for some of these 
offences’. In addition, informants were reportedly subject to ‘baby-sitting’ during 
interviews to avoid incriminating themselves, false notes were generated and 
searches of houses and of an arms dump were blocked, while misleading information 
was prepared for the director of public prosecutions and vital intelligence likely to 
have assisted in the investigation of crimes, including murder, was withheld from 
investigating teams.  
 
The three-and-a-half year investigation (‘Operation Ballast’) was, according to Ms 
O’Loan, impeded by documents missing, lost or destroyed, including sections from 
murder files, decision logs and intelligence material, which prevented senior officers 
being held to account. In her view, this was a deliberate stratagem to ensure there 
could be no prosecutions. She reported that when questioned the former chief 
                                                  
25 J. Stalker, Stalker (London: Harrap, 1988). 
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constable, Sir Ronnie Flanagan,
26 was unable to assist the investigation, that two 
retired assistant chief constables refused to co-operate and that other police officers 
(including some still in the PSNI) ‘gave evasive, contradictory and, on occasion, 
farcical answers to questions’, which ‘indicated either a significant failure to 
understand the law, or contempt for the law’.  
 
Political reaction to the report was uniform. Downing Street described it as ‘deeply 
disturbing’, as did the taoiseach, Bertie Ahern, who said that its findings were ‘of the 
utmost gravity’ and painted ‘a picture of despicable past behaviour’. The Northern 
Ireland secretary echoed the current chief constable, Sir Hugh Orde, in saying that 
the report made for ‘extremely uncomfortable reading’ but, mindful of the then 
impending SF ard fheis, insisted that the catalogue of documented behaviour ‘could 
not happen today not least because of the accountability mechanisms that have been 
put in place over recent years’.
27 SF’s reaction was to claim vindication. As Martin 
McGuinness said, ‘for 25 years we argued that there was collusion ... causing the 
deaths of over 1,000 people. There is no doubt whatsoever, in my view, that the most 
senior people imaginable within the RUC were involved in this. This was institutional 
practice.’  
 
No officers (or informants) were named in the report but Mr Hain, among others, 
noted that it created ‘all sorts of opportunities for prosecutions to follow’. But Jimmy 
Spratt, a DUP assembly member and former chair of the Northern Ireland Police 
Federation, dismissed the report: ‘If it had had one shred of credible evidence then 
we could have expected charges against former police officers. There are no 
charges, so the public should draw their own conclusion.’  
 
Mr Spratt cited the report as ‘another clear example why both serving and former 
police officers have no confidence in the Police Ombudsman or her office’, a 
sentiment that was later reinforced by the federation. In the considerable wake of 
Operation Ballast it published a letter to Ms O’Loan, announcing that it would no 
longer issue invitations to her office for attendance at any of its committees or 
conferences and that it was withdrawing from working parties or fora led by or on 
                                                  
26 Sir Ronnie, currently the head of Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary, said in response: ‘I 
utterly refute any suggestion … that I was in any way evasive or unhelpful … at no time did I have any 
knowledge, or evidence, of officers at any level behaving in the ways described. I would find such 
conduct abhorrent and if such behaviour took place my hope would be that it would be the subject of 
criminal or disciplinary proceedings’—BBC News Online (23 January 2007).  
27 For a summary of political reaction, see BBC News Online (22 January 2007). 
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behalf of her office. It claimed the ombudsman’s office ‘was destructive to the 
reputation of the RUC and if continued in its present form … would inevitably 
undermine public confidence in the PSNI’.
28
 
An extensive rebuttal was subsequently furnished by the Northern Ireland Retired 
Police Officers’ Association, a body representing more than 3,000 ex-officers, 
including former Special Branch personnel criticised in the report.
29 It described the 
latter as error-strewn, including in claiming—this dismissed as ‘a lie’—that senior 
officers had refused to co-operate with the inquiry, which had allegedly decided its 
conclusions first and then organised evidence to support those presumptions, treated 
hearsay as evidence and compromised the current safety of officers and informants 
by ‘virtually’ identifying them. A copy of the rebuttal was sent to the Northern Ireland 




The publication of the police ombudsman’s report just days before SF’s ard fheis 
caused consternation in some quarters, where it was believed that it would bolster 
those within ‘mainstream’ republicanism opposed to endorsement of the PSNI. Any 
such apprehension turned out to be largely unfounded as delegates overwhelmingly 
endorsed the executive’s motion. Indeed, the SF leadership turned the report to its 
advantage in advance. Acknowledging that republicans would ‘not be surprised or 
shocked by the revelations’, the party president, Gerry Adams, added that ‘it’s an 
incentive that the mechanisms which were put in place for accountability [of the 
PSNI], which we put in place and which we have argued for, now need to be 
deployed, not only to make sure that this does not happen again, but if it does, that 
those who are guilty will be dealt with properly’.
31  
 
Notwithstanding the decisive outcome of the ard fheis, nor the encouragement by 
senior figures in SF that nationalists should assist the police in criminal 
investigations, simmering doubts about its commitment flared in the light of remarks 
by its MP (and assembly member) for Fermanagh / South Tyrone, Michelle 
Gildernew. She said during a TV interview that she would not report to the police 
                                                  
28 See www.policefed-ni.org.uk. 
29 See, for example, News Letter (21 March 2007), for extensive coverage. The rebuttal formed the 
basis of an adjournment debate in the Commons, tabled by the DUP MP Jeffrey Donaldson, during 
which he roundly dismissed the report as ‘crucially flawed’. HC Deb, 21 March 2007, cols. 313-320WH. 
30 For Ms O’Loan’s reaction, see BBC News Online (21 March 2007). 
31 BBC News Online (22 January 2007). 
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‘dissident’ republicans who had been, or were, involved in criminal activities. Her 
remark was seized upon by the DUP as evidence of SF equivocation on policing, 
despite assurances to the contrary from the party’s leaders, including its 
spokesperson on police and criminal justice, Gerry Kelly. For those in the DUP who 
harboured fundamental doubts about the wisdom of entering an executive alongside 
SF, at least in the short run, her reported remarks were a godsend, and presented 
those of its number reconciled to power-sharing with a further obstacle to overcome. 
 
While the reaction to the publication of the Operation Ballast report continued to 
reverberate, another investigation was under way by the police ombudsman—this 
time into alleged collusion between the former senior IRA figure Freddie Scappaticci, 
alias ‘Stakeknife’, and the army. The investigation was triggered by a complaint from 
the parents of John Dignam, murdered by the IRA along with two other men, all 
alleged to be informers, in July 1992. The claim was that the three men were killed to 
protect Mr Scappaticci as head of the IRA’s internal security unit, and that he was 
safeguarded by army ‘handlers’. Now in hiding, the expectation is that he will be 
revealed to be the republican equivalent of Mr Haddock, albeit that he was run by 
military intelligence rather than the RUC. Thus far, Mr Scappaticci has avoided the 
grisly end suffered by Denis Donaldson, murdered in Donegal in April 2006, most 
likely by members of the IRA, after he admitted to having long acted as an agent for 
the intelligence services. 
1.4   Election and after 
The issue of SF’s support for policing and criminal justice seemingly resolved, the 
remaining matter of the DUP’s readiness to enter an inclusive, power-sharing 
administration was still uncertain as the election campaign got under way. The 
campaign itself was widely deemed somewhat lacklustre, given that it focused more 
on ‘bread-and-butter’ issues than the wider drama of the constitutional status of 
Northern Ireland (see political parties and elections section).  
 
In a sense, this was symptomatic of the normalcy of the new politics in the region, 
with electors animated by the impending introduction of water charges, the new 
rating system, the proposed ending of academic selection and, to a lesser extent, the 
proposed reforms of public administration. Notwithstanding the prominence given by 
the parties’ manifestos to economic and social issues—a pre-election poll (see 
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public-attitudes section) put health at the top of the electorate’s agenda
32—few 
doubted that, as ever, when the results were calculated voters would shepherd 
themselves into mutually exclusive communal voting blocs.  
 
And so it largely proved. This did not, however, stop the government leaking the 
result of an exit poll to the Belfast Telegraph indicating 82 per cent of voters wanted 
the DUP and SF to agree an executive by 26 March, and prioritising water charges 
as the main issue of concern.
33
 
Should the election lead to the restoration of devolution, which seemed certain at 
time of writing, and a fully inclusive executive, then on the basis of the results it 
would,  via application of the d’Hondt rule, yield a 7:5 unionist:nationalist balance 
around the ‘cabinet’ table. There would be five DUP ministers, including Mr Paisley 
as first minister; four SF ministers, including Mr McGuinness as deputy first minister; 
two UUP ministers and one SDLP minister. 
 
With the electoral die cast, the key question became: would the DUP countenance a 
power-sharing administration alongside SF, and on what terms, by the ‘deadline’ of 
26 March? Initially, the answer seemed to be ‘definitely maybe’ and then became 
‘yes, but not quite yet’, ie not by the deadline stipulated in the St Andrews Act.
34  
 
The parties put on a common front to press the chancellor to give Northern Ireland a 
further ‘peace dividend’ (see finance section). And, with the clock ticking towards 26 
March, separate meetings and telephone calls between Messrs Paisley and Adams 
and Mr Blair, between the latter and Mr Ahern, and between all of the key players 
and the Northern Ireland secretary continued—the context shaped by Mr Hain’s 
apparent insistence that unless devolution occurred on the scheduled day, the 
assembly would be dissolved, the salaries and expenses of the MLAs would cease, 
and London and Dublin would implement the (undefined) default option of ‘joint 
stewardship’. 
 
                                                  
32 Thirty per cent say or respondents said health was the most important issue, as against 13 per cent 
who said strengthening the union with Britain or moving to a united Ireland—C. Thornton, ‘Health is 
biggest issue on doorstep’, Belfast Telegraph (2 March 2007). 
33 C. Thornton, ‘DUP/SF deal “backed by 82% of voters”’, Belfast Telegraph (16 March 2007). 
34 The apparent readiness of the DUP’s MLAs to enter a power-sharing administration was signalled by 
a survey of 27 of its 36 members. It found that almost all believed there would be an executive that 
included SF, though only one believed it would be in place by 26 March—Belfast Telegraph (15 March 
2006). 
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Yet few, if any, believed that 26 March would prove to be ‘D’ day in either sense—
devolution or dissolution—in large part because the ‘peace’ and political processes 
have been characterised by the breaking of deadlines, from the original 1998 
agreement to date. Yet in mid-January, Mr Hain could not have been more pellucid: 
‘The people of Northern Ireland will not stand for politicians dragging this out any 
longer. They, like me, believe that now is the time for politicians to go into devolved 
government together or Stormont closes down.’
35  
 
In mid-February, briefing the US administration, he said there was not a ‘cat in hell’s 
chance’ of the government extending the deadline.
36 After a British-Irish 
Intergovernmental Conference meeting in Dundalk exactly one month before the 
fateful day, his Dublin counterpart, Mr Ahern, said it was the ‘absolute, cast-iron 
position’ of both governments that 26 March was ‘set in stone’.
37 And with just a week 
to go, Mr Hain insisted a delay to May to form an executive—as sought by the DUP—
was an ‘absolute non-runner’.
38
 
Yet, as the deadline approached, the Northern Ireland secretary began to give coded 
messages that the government would in effect provide a soft landing (in the form of 
emergency legislation) to extend the deadline if the two major parties were within 
touching distance of an agreement. And so it was to be. 
 
It was later reported that, in the wake of the election, the home secretary (and former 
Northern Ireland secretary), Mr Reid, had been in touch with the region’s key 
politicians assuring them that what mattered was less the date by which a deal was 
concluded than the fact that a deal was secured on Mr Blair’s watch as prime 
minister. If true, this undermined Mr Hain’s seemingly muscular insistence on the 26 
March deadline—and, presumably, Dr Reid would only have intervened with the (at 
least) tacit knowledge of No. 10. The report was however denied by the DUP deputy 
leader, Peter Robinson, during the Commons debate on the emergency bill.
39  
 
On 22 March, DUP officers drew up a resolution to be presented to the party’s 120-
member Executive Council two days later, which acknowledged ‘that a significant 
                                                  
35 C. Thornton, ‘Deadline for Stormont is final: Hain’, Belfast Telegraph (19 January 2007). 
36 D. Staunton, ‘“Gesture” on Croke Park killings considered', Irish Times (15 February 2007). 
37 D de Bréadún, ‘Cost of cross-border roads to be shared’, Irish Times (27 February 2007). 
38 G. Moriarty and M. Donahoe, ‘London, Dublin stand firm over North deadline’, Irish Times (20 March 
2007). 
39HC Deb, 27 March 2007, col. 1328. 
21 Northern Ireland Devolution Monitoring Report    April 2007 
opportunity exists to have devolution returned in a context which can make real and 
meaningful improvement in the lives of all the people in NI’. Thus, it recommended 
that the DUP ‘would support and participate fully in a NI Executive if powers were 
devolved to it on an agreed date in May’. It continued: ‘We are willing to bridge the 
short gap between now and then with preparatory work including departmental pre-
briefings and finalising a Programme for Government. This firm commitment is 
offered within an environment where no one, including the government, goes back on 
any of the advances and commitments made.’
40 Mr Hain now suggested there could 
be a ‘breathing space’ for a ‘settling-in’ period after 26 March.
41
 
The next day, a ‘tough’ meeting took place between the prime minister and Mr 
Paisley. Mr Blair was still refusing the latter’s demand to introduce emergency 
legislation at Westminster so that the devolved executive would in effect be 
suspended on 26 March as soon as formed, amid fear on the government side that 
Mr Blair’s legacy was slipping away.
42
 
Following a four-hour meeting of the DUP executive on 24 March, the leadership’s 
resolution was endorsed, reportedly by more than 90 per cent of its members. In the 
course of a brief statement after the meeting, Mr Paisley said the ‘Ulster people’—ie 
Protestants—‘will be persuaded, they will not be driven’ to acceptance of the terms 
upon which his party would enter an inclusive administration.
43 Thus, the scene was 
set for the restoration of devolution. 
 
On 25 March, Mr Hain signed the devolution restoration order, still promising collapse 
the next day if the parties couldn’t agree a way ahead.
44 And, on the morning of 26 
March, the Guardian reported that in light of the DUP decision the government was to 
back down on the deadline, with emergency legislation to be drafted revoking the 
dissolution requirement following the legislation implementing the St Andrews 
agreement, if Messrs Paisley and Adams were to agree during a meeting that day.
45
 
                                                  
40 DUP news release, 25 March 2007. 
41 N. McAdam, ‘”Breathing” space idea mooted’, Belfast Telegraph (22 March 2007). 
42 F. Millar, ‘DUP may have plan to break Monday deadline’, Irish Times (24 March 2007); O. Bowcott, 
‘Paisley faces DUP rebellion over power sharing deadline’, Guardian (24 March 2007. 
43 BBC News Online (24 March 2007). 
44 BBC News Online (25 March 2007). 
45 P. Wintour and O. Bowcott, ‘Paisley and Adams to meet for first time to break deadlock’, Guardian (26 
March 2007). 
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Thus, for the first time, Mr Paisley and his team sat down for an hour-long, face-to-
face meeting with Mr Adams and his senior SF colleagues in the unlikely, but neutral, 
setting of the members’ dining room in Parliament Buildings at Stormont. That 
meeting was preceded by proximity talks over the weekend between the DUP and 
SF teams, led, respectively, by Mr Robinson and Mr McGuinness. The talks were 
held at Stormont Castle, base of the Northern Ireland Office, and laid the groundwork 
for Monday’s events. Shortly afterwards the two leaders appeared together, flanked 
by colleagues, to confirm that devolved power-sharing would resume on 8 May.
46  
1.5 Devolution  redux 
It was a remarkable occasion: indeed, one had to pinch oneself to check that it 
wasn’t a dream, or that there wasn’t something wrong with the TV (see media 
section).
47 Though there was no handshake and little if any eye contact, the shared 
commitment to the return of a power-sharing administration was evident. The two 
leaders, first Mr Paisley, then Mr Adams, read prepared statements, the former 
saying: ‘We as a party have agreed the timing, the setting-up and working of the 
institutions. Today we have agreed with Sinn Féin that this date will be Tuesday 8 
May.’ For his part, Mr Adams remarked: ‘I believe the agreement reached between 
Sinn Féin and the DUP, including the unequivocal commitment, made by their party 
Executive and reiterated today, to the restoration of political institutions on May 8
th, 
marks the beginning of a new era of politics on this island.’  
 
To enable the agreement to be implemented and provide for the six-week delay, Mr 
Hain confirmed that a two-clause emergency bill would be rushed through Parliament 
on 27 March: so much for his, Mr Blair’s and Mr Ahern’s, insistence that 26 March 
was utterly immovable. Yet none could countenance other than that the space and 
time be found to usher in what could yet turn out to be a truly historic administration.  
 
One of the first, effectively joint, acts between the DUP and SF was to call on the 
government to halt the planned issue of the new water bills—a request that was 
accepted. Was this a sign of collectivist things to come? Possibly. Between the end 
of March and early May the DUP would, according to its leader, ‘participate fully with 
the other parties to the Executive in making full preparations for the restoration of 
                                                  
46 The full texts of Dr Paisley’s and Mr Adams’ statements are available on UTV News Online (26 March 
2007). 
47 The SDLP leader, Mr Durkan, during the debate on the emergency bill, captured the incredulity of 
many: ‘I have observed before that our peace process has carried more people on more roads to 
Damascus than the Syrian bus fleet, and we saw that again yesterday.’—HC Deb, 27 March 2007, col. 
1331. 
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devolution’, a process that would ‘include regular meetings between the future First 
and Deputy First Ministers’. Thus, and for the first time, Messrs Paisley and 
McGuinness would co-operate face-to-face—though, as Mr Paisley reportedly put it, 
‘it will be a work-in not a love-in’.  
 
The surprise of 26 March was compounded when, a week later, the parties 
announced an effective indicative running of d’Hondt. Both the DUP and SF indicated 
who their ministerial teams would comprise and on 2 April they announced which of 
the departments each would take, a set of decisions that signalled the intense and 
swift negotiations over the division of the ministerial spoils. The departmental 
allocation was: 
•  DUP: finance and personnel (DFP); enterprise, trade and investment (DETI); 
environment (DoE); culture, arts and leisure (DCAL); 
•  SF: education (DE); regional development (DRD); agriculture and rural 
development (DARD); 
•  UUP: health, social services and public safety (DHSSPS); employment and 
learning (DEL); and 
•  SDLP: social development (DSD).  
 
On 2 April, SF announced that its team would be Martin McGuinness (as deputy first 
minister), Conor Murphy, Michelle Gildernew, Gerry Kelly and Caitriona Ruane.
48 It 
emerged that Ms Ruane was to take DE, Mr Murphy DRD, Ms Gildernew DARD and 
Mr Kelly one of the two junior ministries in OFMDFM. The SDLP meanwhile indicated 
Margaret Ritchie would assume its sole post at DSD.
49  
 
It was notable that unlike their unionist counterparts, neither of the leaders of the 
nationalist parties, Mr Adams and Mark Durkan of the SDLP, was to be in 
government. The UUP eventually announced that its leader, Sir Reg Empey, would 
take DEL, while the former DCAL minister, Michael McGimpsey, would have 
DHSSPS—leaving in the cold Alan McFarland, who was narrowly defeated by Sir 
Reg for the leadership when David Trimble stepped down in the wake of the previous 
electoral debacle for the party in 2005. 
 
                                                  
48 G. Moriarty, ‘Progress in north continues as parties agree ministries’, Irish Times (3 April 2007). 
49 ‘Sinn Fein reveals ministerial posts’, ‘SDLP’s Ritchie first to be attached to a department’, Belfast 
Telegraph (4 April 2007). 
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It was not until 16 April that the DUP revealed its team. Apart from Mr Paisley as first 
minister, the party’s deputy leader Mr Robinson would assume the reins at DFP, with 
Nigel Dodds taking over DETI, Arlene Foster the DoE and Edwin Poots DCAL. Ian 
Paisley Jr would become the other junior minister in OFMDFM.
50 It is more than 
likely, however, that during the assembly’s mandate the party will rotate its ministers, 
as in 1999-2002.  
 
With that issue resolved, the prospective cabinet could ready itself fully in advance of 
8 May. The business of drawing up the Programme for Government would, no doubt, 
prove troublesome, not least because of yawning and seemingly unbridgeable policy 
gaps between the DUP and SF on a very broad agenda, extending from academic 
selection to the reform of public administration (see public policies section)—a fact 
acknowledged by Mr Adams in the run-up to the election. Anticipating a DUP/SF-led 
administration, he rehearsed his claim that it would be characterised by ‘a battle a 
day’. It was an opinion wryly shared by the Mr Robinson of the DUP: ‘it is the one 
thing we agree on’.
51
 
In January, the Northern Ireland Council for Voluntary Action had issued its 
periodically updated ‘policy manifesto’, the product of consultation among the 4,500 
associations affiliated to it. The director of NICVA, Seamus McAleavey, complained 
of the ‘limbo land’ of ‘caretaker government’, looking forward for the first time in years 
to the prospect of devolution. The manifesto called inter alia for a ban on corporal 
punishment, the raising of the minimum wage for young people, an independent 
environmental protection authority, and improvements in public transport such that 80 
per cent of all households could live within 10 minutes’ access to it. 
 
One item on the DUP’s shopping list to be resolved before it would contemplate 
entering into government with SF was a new exclusion mechanism, one that would 
target the offending party (SF!), rather than one that entailed the punishment of the 
(purportedly) innocent as well as the (allegedly) guilty, as was hitherto the case, by 
the collapse of the entire executive.
52 The party deputy leader, Mr Robinson, insisted 
that mandatory power-sharing could not be ‘enduring’.
53
                                                  
50 N. McAdam, ‘Paisley the Younger to be a junior minister at Stormont’, Belfast Telegraph (16 April 
2007). 
51 BBC News Online (3 March 2007). 
52 While under the previous period of devolution SF was prima facie in breach of its obligation to non-
violence under the Belfast agreement’s pledge of office, for failing to bring about IRA decommissioning 
by May 2000, a similar charge could be laid at the door of the DUP, as the pledge also required 
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This, however, was not conceded by the two governments in the run-up to 26 March. 
So, while the DUP, together with the other three major parties, made some modest 
headway on the financial package, should a future crisis threaten the survival of the 
executive, as things stood all parties would once more be jettisoned from office, 
including the DUP. One could, however, expect the DUP to revisit this. 
 
The absence of such a discrete mechanism was one reason for the decision of the 
DUP’s MEP, Jim Allister, to resign from the party on 27 March. Mr Allister, who had 
also resigned from the party in the late 1980s over a UUP-DUP electoral pact, had 
campaigned assiduously against what he saw as a premature decision to enter an 
administration alongside SF and had voted against the resolution endorsed by the 
DUP executive three days earlier.
54 Speaking at a news conference convened to 
publicise his resignation, he said: 
To continue as the DUP’s MEP, it would be my obligation to accept the party 
executive policy decision to usher SF into government in a few short weeks. 
This in conscience I cannot do. Thus, I must resign from the party. SF, in my 
view, is not fit for government. Nor can it be in a few weeks. I just cannot 
comprehend how the DUP can contemplate government, particularly where it 
will be joined at the hip in OFMDFM, with an organisation which clings to an 
illegal army council of an illegal army. It seems to me that, sadly, the lure of 
office has clouded the party’s judgment.
55
 
The departure of Mr Allister, who intends to hold on to his European Parliament seat 
until 2009, did not prompt a flurry of other resignations, although a number of DUP 
councillors had deserted in the run-up to the election, as did others afterwards, 
including the Ballymena councillor and DUP founder member Roy Gillespie. Jim 
Wells, the only MLA to vote against the party’s resolution on 24 March, made public 
his reservations. But, like David Simpson MP, MLA and Stephen Moutray MLA, who 
issued a joint statement indicating that they believed the decision, ‘ahead of any 
credible testing period’, was ‘premature’,
56 Mr Wells chose not to fall on his sword.
57 It 
                                                                                                                                         
ministers to work with colleagues on the Programme for Government and the party refused to attend 
executive meetings. 
53 Inside Politics, BBC Radio Ulster (3 March 2007). 
54 Mr Allister set out his position well in advance of the election. See Belfast Telegraph (9 January 
2007). 
55 BBC News Online (27 March 2007). 
56 BBC News Online (29 March 2007).  
57 News Letter (30 March 2007). William McCrea was another DUP MP who voiced his distaste at the 
deal: ‘As far as I am concerned, the idea of Sinn Fein in government is obnoxious. It makes me sick to 
the pit of my stomach.’ But he too remains in the party—HC Deb, 27 March 2007, col. 1346. 
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seems that the DUP’s capacity to manage its membership is on a par with SF’s: 
Stalinist ruthlessness doesn’t only (allegedly) prevail at 11 Downing St.  
1.6 Buying  loyalty? 
During the election period, the NIO was relatively inactive on the policy front, 
although of course its collective effort was bent towards the achievement of an 
agreement between the DUP and SF.  
 
It was not, however, inert. One decision in particular demonstrated its capacity to 
surprise and anger the region’s population, Catholic or Protestant
58—the 
announcement that it was to award £1.2 million to the Ulster Political Research 
Group for ‘conflict transformation’.
59 The UPRG, which provides political ‘analysis’ to 
the largest loyalist paramilitary organisation, the UDA, had drawn up a business plan 
designed, over a three-year period, to move the UDA away from violence and crime 
so that it became a ‘community’ association rather than a terrorist group.  
 
The monies are to be used in six areas where the UDA has a strong presence, will 
be administered by Farset Community Enterprises in west Belfast, and will employ up 
to a dozen staff. The NIO’s decision attracted criticism from all quarters, not least 
because the UDA was subsequently described by a senior police officer as ‘still up to 
their necks in extortion’.
60 And, of course, the UDA, like the other major (and minor) 
loyalist paramilitaries, is yet to decommission its arsenal.
61  
 
At the end of March one UDA ‘brigadier’ and his adviser, respectively Gary Fisher 
and Tommy Kirkham,
62 were expelled, a move interpreted by some as an attempt to 
justify the award of the money by the NIO. This evident power struggle could yet 
deteriorate into a round of intra-organisational violence. 
 
While internecine struggle raged within the motley and shambolic demi-monde of 
loyalist paramilitarism, the well-disciplined IRA was reportedly moving to disband its 
                                                  
58 A stream of angry messages were sent to BBC Radio Ulster after it publicised the announcement, 
variously arguing that the money should have gone to hard-pressed public services and that this 
showed that crime paid. 
59 OFMDFM news release, 22 March 2007. 
60 BBC News Online (23 March 2007). 
61 The Loyalist Volunteer Force, a splinter of the Ulster Volunteer Force, did surrender a small number of 
old/obsolete weapons and munitions in December 1998. 
62 In October 2006 Mr Kirkham had sought £8.5 million from the NIO to assist in transforming the UDA’s 
notorious ‘south-east Antrim unit’ into a ‘community-development’ body. He and Mr Fisher were expelled 
because they supported the Shoukri brothers, who had earlier been dethroned as the men in charge of 
the UDA in north Belfast—Belfast Telegraph (29 March 2007). 
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army council, possibly in advance of, or to coincide with, the planned restoration of 
devolution on 8 May. In some measure this impending decision was influenced by 
the run-down of the army presence towards a garrison strength of 5,000, planned 
since 2003. The run-down was, according to the IMC, ahead of schedule.  
 
At the end of March a significant step was taken when the army base in 
Crossmaglen, Co Armagh—the heart of what soldiers once described as ‘bandit 
country’—was closed and its dismantling begun. At almost the same time another 
symbol of the ‘troubles’ years was also being demolished—the Maze prison, site of 
the ‘H-blocks’. Though some parts of the complex will be retained as a museum and 
a ‘conflict transformation’ centre, the demolition of most of the buildings will erase a 
scar from the physical and political landscape. 
1.7 Conclusion 
Barring accidents, it seemed assured at time of writing that from 8 May—for the first 
time since 15 October 2002—Northern Ireland would again be a devolved region of 
the UK, as well, of course, as one with a special relationship with the Republic of 
Ireland. The division of the ministerial spoils announced on 2 April augured well for a 
more business-like approach to the conduct of government. As things stood, the 
stated determination of both the DUP and SF to work together for the benefit of all 
was promising. One would have to postpone judgment, however, to assess the 
extent to which that promise is fulfilled. 
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2. Devolved  Government 
Robin Wilson 
2.1   Rationalisation postponed 
The tocsin is now chiming for the demise of direct rule. Its complement of secretary 
of state plus four junior ministers will find themselves with much less to do come 8 
May. One can anticipate that the ministerial team will be reduced to a total of three 
(including the Northern Ireland secretary), as before the restoration of direct rule in 
October 2002. 
 
But devolution will put off a rationalisation avoided when the previous devolved 
administration launched its review of sub-regional governance only in 2002 (see 
local-government section). With no sign of an imminent restoration, Mr Hain’s special 
adviser, Phil Taylor, had produced a plan, which was leaked to the Belfast Telegraph, 
to reduce the number of Northern Ireland ‘devolved’ departments from 10 to six with 
effect from April 2008. Mr Hain had described the prevailing departmental 
arrangements as ‘unsustainable’ in the light of the review of public administration, 
while the former NIO minister Lord Rooker had said they were ‘absolutely barmy’.
63
 
Under the plan, the Office of the First Minister and Deputy First Minister would 
incorporate the Department of Finance and Personnel. The Department of Education 
and the Department of Enterprise, Trade and Investment would each incorporate part 
of the Department of Employment and Learning. The already big Department of 
Health, Social Services and Public Safety would remain as was. And there would be 
two new departments: a Department for Sustainable Development and Energy, 
incorporating much of the Department of Agriculture and Rural Development and the 
Department for Regional Development, and a new Department for Communities and 
Inclusion, replacing the Department for Social Development.  
 
This was not only with a view to saving money but to address the problem that the 
OFMDFM had ‘little or no clout’ over departments. One of the bizarre effects of the 
Belfast agreement, reflecting the mutual mistrust among the parties which agreed it, 
is that each minister is effectively independent of the others. Thus, whereas in 
Scotland, the permanent secretary, Sir John Elvidge, accountable to the first minister, 
                                                  
63 D. Gordon, ‘Blueprint to slash Ulster departments is revealed’, Belfast Telegraph (10 January 2007). 
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can direct any member of the executive staff, in Northern Ireland each of the 10 
departments has a permanent secretary, who can reject such requests from the 
OFMDFM permanent secretary if they have contrary ministerial cover. To add further 
complexity, each department now has an advisory ‘board’, mimicking private-
enterprise structures and with many business members, being paid up to £500 a day 
for their services; the SDLP MLA John Dallat said the new assembly would want to 
‘take a cold, hard look’ at this arrangement, which the OFMDFM defended as ‘best 
practice’ from the private sector.
64
 
The system of departmental fiefdoms creates real difficulty in the implementation of 
key cross-departmental strategies, such as A Shared Future (on ‘community 
relations’),  Lifetime Opportunities (on social inclusion) and First Steps Towards 
Sustainability (on sustainable development)—all of them introduced under direct rule. 
In each case he OFMDFM is the lead department.
65
 
Reform is, in such technocratic terms, unarguable. And, ironically, the 10-department 
structure was only agreed in 1998 between the then first and deputy first ministers 
designate, Mr Trimble and Séamus Mallon (SDLP) respectively, to secure two seats 
for SF when d’Hondt was run, implicitly because anything less might see republicans 
less committed to the ‘peace strategy’. Such a calculation no longer applies, as SF, 
and the DUP, have gobbled up their ethnic rivals, but none of the parties even talked 
about biting on the bullet of reform before they ran d’Hondt indicatively to prepare the 
ground for devolution in May. Bums on seats triumphed over ‘joined-up’ government, 
without a contest. 
 
Mr Taylor announced his departure during the period, to work with Mr Hain on his 
deputy Labour leadership campaign. He had been at the heart of the policy activism, 
which we had detected during this period of direct rule, since his arrival with the 
current Northern Ireland secretary. He tried hard to extract stronger commitments 
from senior officials on policies like Lifetime Opportunities, working against the grain 
of a conservative civil service, insulated by its separation from the rest of the ‘home’ 
                                                  
64 D. Gordon, ‘The execs paid £500 a day to oversee Ulster departments’, Belfast Telegraph (16 
February, 2007). 
65 Office of the First Minister and Deputy First Minister, Lifetime Opportunities: Government’s Anti-
poverty and Social Inclusion Strategy for Northern Ireland (Belfast: OFMDFM, 2006, at: 
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civil service from policy stimulation in Britain, and insulated equally (by the absence 
of the north-south units found in every department in the republic) from initiatives 
south of the border.  
 
And so his move was marked by anonymous recriminations. A civil-service source 
accusing Mr Taylor of being ‘bombastic’, while Mr Hain’s side replied that the 
Northern Ireland civil service was not used to a secretary of state who did not just 
‘hold the fort’ and let departments run themselves.
66  
 
The new ministers will feel no particular obligation to the big direct-rule policy 
initiatives. And whether they show any commitment to reconciliation, social inclusion 
and environmental sustainability—all of which imply a positioning on the secular 
liberal-left of the policy spectrum—rather than communalism and populism will 
remain to be seen. An obvious test will be the fate of the planning directive 
restraining one-off housing in rural areas on environmental grounds, which all the 
parties have opposed. 
 
As expected, during the monitoring period the European Court of Justice ruled 
against the government in a case inspired by Friends of the Earth which concerned 
thirteen UK locations—nine in Northern Ireland—where there had been a failure to 
comply with the 1991 environment directive on waste treatment. The situation in 
Northern Ireland had arisen from the decision under devolution by the then 
environment minister, Dermot Nesbitt, to permit a number of housing developments, 
knowing sewage treatment arrangements were inadequate. FoE warned of huge 
fines.
67
2.2 Impartial  treatment? 
A Shared Future commits government to uphold the principle of impartial treatment, 
and the Northern Ireland Act 1998 implementing the Belfast agreement requires all 
public bodies, including government departments, to give due regard to equal 
opportunities along nine axes, including religion / political opinion, which translates 
into subjecting new policies to assessments of any potential differential effects. 
 
But this apparently straightforward norm conflicts with the Realpolitik which New 
Labour has adopted towards Northern Ireland, which was evident in the decision to 
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offer public funding to a UDA-linked group in the face of public bewilderment, and 
which the former deputy first minister Mr Mallon reflected upon so bitterly during the 
reporting period (see ‘peace process’ section). It was thus that the Northern Ireland 
secretary, Mr Hain, got himself in very hot water over the appointment of a DUP 
nominee as an ‘interim victims commissioner’—a matter on which the attorney 
general is still making inquiries at the behest of a High Court judge in Belfast—and of 
two Orangemen to the Parades Commission, both in the wake of loyalist riots 
following the rerouting of an Orange march in Belfast in September 2005.
68
 
In this period, Mr Hain took no chances. When a further appointment arose to the 
Parades Commission, which determines whether (mainly Protestant-communal) 
marches go ahead, and if so under what conditions, under the 1998 Public 
Processions Act, he went for a squeaky-clean approach. Kelly Andrews, being co-
leader of the Green Party in the region and a feminist, thereby counts in the odd 
political culture of Northern Ireland as manifestly impartial.
69
 
Shortly afterwards, the Interim victims’ commissioner, Bertha McDougall, reported at 
the conclusion of her role, as the NIO advertised publicly for a permanent 
replacement.
70 Her report called for a new £8 million compensation fund (in the first 
year) for victims. She specifically recommended, however, a fund for widows of 
murdered members of the Ulster Defence Regiment, an almost entirely Protestant 
force which suffered large losses at the hands of the IRA before it was disbanded / 
integrated into the army because of the engagement of some of its members in 
harassment of Catholics and collusion with loyalist paramilitaries. This proposal was 
predictably backed by the DUP and—equally predictably—rejected by SF.
71
 
A continuing sore, and again in sharp contradiction to A Shared Future, has been the 
‘Renewing Communities’ scheme run by the Department for Social Development. 
The anodyne title conceals its origins as a response to a ‘taskforce’ on Protestant 
working-class communities, which it was suggested lacked the collective efficacy of 
their Catholic counterparts and so merited differential treatment
72—a position 
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sustained by government even when independent research it commissioned failed to 
justify this stereotyped conception, though the Northern Ireland Council for Voluntary 
Action could only extract that intelligence via a Freedom of Information request.
73
 
During the survey period, Dolores Kelly wrote on behalf of the SDLP to Mr Hain to 
demand an explanation for the ‘blatant injustice and inequality’ of the scheme. Ms 
Kelly insisted that it was a case of ‘No Catholics need apply’. The government’s 
defence was to claim that Renewing Communities was not in breach of section 75 of 
the Northern Ireland Act, as it was supporting piloting projects and thus not yet 
‘mainstream policy’.
74
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3.   The Assembly 
Rick Wilford 
3.1   Debates  
Following the election, the assembly—which retained its ‘Transitional’ status
75—met 
on two plenary occasions with the acting Speaker, Eileen Bell, in the chair.
76 The first, 
on 13 March, was to enable the MLAs to sign the membership roll and to designate 
themselves as ‘unionist’, ‘nationalist’ or ‘other’.  
 
Prior to the signing-in, the Alliance leader, David Ford, announced that his seven 
MLAs, plus the Independent Kieran Deeny and the Green Party’s Brian Wilson, 
would register as the ‘United Community’ group. As Mr Ford put it, ‘It makes sense to 
work with those closest to us. People have said that they expect politicians to co-
operate. We have taken the first step by forming a strong, coherent and constructive 
opposition. [It] signals our intent to take on the tribal parties, and deliver a new brand 
of politics which works for everyone’.
77 While it may prove coherent and constructive, 
its strength—other than moral—in the face of the four major parties which took 98 of 
the 108 seats, is somewhat questionable, though it is capable of punching above its 
weight. 
 
The second plenary occurred a week later, to debate the draft statutory ministerial 
code and draft standing orders. Both had been considered under the aegis of the 
Programme for Government Committee, which had continued to meet until the end of 
January and which renewed its work on 13 March.
78  
 
Before its pre-election dissolution, the assembly had met during January to debate a 
variety of issues, including, on a more local agenda, the proposed closure of post 
offices, road safety, autism, affordable housing, the Bain report on the rationalisation 
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of the schools estate,
79 rural schools, social disadvantage and educational 
attainment, rates reform and water charges and, on a more expansive plane, the 
comprehensive spending review, north-south co-operation and the welfare reform 
bill.  
 
At its last session, on 29 January, one of the items for debate was liquor licensing—
on the face of it, not a notably contentious matter. But the vote of the assembly 
Business Committee to include it (and ‘tie-up aid’ for farmers) instead of the police 
ombudsman’s report on collusion, as proposed by SF, prompted the republican 
MLAs to withdraw from the chamber in protest. 
 
The assembly did not resolve before the election the stand-off between the parties on 
the devolution of policing. The six sub-groups of the Programme for Government 
committee reported, but there was no agreement on whether policing and justice 
should have two co-equal ministers or one, whether it or they should be appointed by 
d’Hondt or require a supportive 70 per cent assembly majority, or when powers 
should be devolved.
80
3.2 MLA  changes 
During January there was some turnover in assembly members. Marietta Farrell 
(SDLP) was nominated to replace Patricia Lewsley, who had resigned to take up the 
post of Northern Ireland commissioner for children and young people. Ms Farrell did 
run at the election in Lagan Valley but was unsuccessful. Dawn Purvis replaced the 
deceased PUP leader, David Ervine, and retained the seat in East Belfast on 7 
March. Geraldine Dougan (SF) replaced the also-deceased Michael Ferguson (West 
Belfast) but chose to sit as an Independent Nationalist from 15 January, as a token of 
her opposition to the impending support by SF for the PSNI; Ms Dougan did not 
contest the election. One disaffected former SF MLA, Davy Hyland, had been 
deselected by the party in the run-up to the election and he did choose to stand, 
unsuccessfully, as an Independent Republican in Newry & Armagh (he had adopted 
the designation as an Independent Nationalist with effect from 19 December 2006). 
 
At the 2007 election 77 incumbent MLAs—that is, elected in November 2003—were 
returned to the assembly. But that was not a fully functioning assembly and the 
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members were unable to cut their legislative or scrutinising teeth. Of the 108 MLAs 
returned on 7 March, just 48 had also served in the first assembly. In effect, there is a 
limited pool of corporate experience available for the new mandate, which will mean 
most members will be fresh to the extensive repertoire of roles they must perform.  
 
Given that there will be 12 ministers and two junior ministers in the executive, each of 
whom is precluded from a role in the assembly’s committees, the pool of tried and 
tested members will be shallower still. As in the 1999-2002 devolved period, most 
members will have to embark on a steep learning curve to come to terms with their 
varied and extensive responsibilities.
81
 
Departing MLAs were each entitled to a ‘resettlement allowance’ of £15,900 and an 
additional £16,000 to cover ‘winding-up’ expenses. And, as if a politics-weary 
Northern Ireland public needed any reminder, they were updated by the Belfast 
Telegraph in April as to just how much the mainly mothballed assembly had cost the 
taxpayer since October 2002. Until the end of February, 53 months after it was put 
into suspension, the tally had reached £108.1 million. According to figures provided 
by the NIO, that broke down into £47.7 million for assembly members' salaries, 
allowances and expenses and £60.4 million for ‘running costs’.
82
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4.   The Media 
Robin Wilson 
4.1   ‘The big picture’ 
The media event of the reporting period was the joint appearance at Stormont on 26 
March of the DUP and SF leaderships, announcing their agreement on the formation 
of a devolved executive. 
 
For the occasion of the news conference, the two party teams did not sit facing each 
other—still less shaking hands—but at a right angle. The two veteran leaders, 
Messrs Paisley and Adams, were perched within a few feet of each other at the 
corner. It hardly compared with the image of Bono holding the arms aloft of David 
Trimble and John Hume, then respectively UUP and SDLP leaders, now both 
eclipsed by their ethnic outbidders, at the Waterfront Hall in Belfast during the ‘yes’ 
campaign for the agreement that had been reached on Good Friday in 1998—and 
not just because then the public, literally, felt much more part of the show.  
 
Indeed, under the revisions to the Belfast agreement secured by the DUP at St 
Andrews in October 2006, there was no longer the symbolically significant 
requirement that the first and deputy first ministers be jointly elected by the assembly. 
That provision had itself been inspired by the joint offer of condolences by Mr Trimble 
and Mr Mallon to two families (one Catholic, one Protestant) bereaved by loyalist 
killers in Poyntzpass, Co Armagh, in the run-up to the original Stormont deal. 
 
Still, the photo of the grinning Mr Adams and the more wanly smiling Mr Paisley 
winged around the world—appearing, for example with the New York Times story on 
the development.
83 It provided the basis, too, for an Irish Times editorial claim—'The 
big picture says it all’—although the paper warned that events or dissidents could 
derail the plan.
84 Most of the UK coverage was effusive,
85 though the Guardian, 
which placed the story on page 4 (with the picture) rather than on the cover, 
cautioned: ‘It was a day to remember, but still a day for two hearty cheers rather than 
the full-throated three.’
86  
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Government, however, was very aware of the utility of the image, given the 
international community’s investment in the Northern Ireland ‘peace process’ for 
more than a decade, and the sense of ennui in recent years with an endlessly 
baffling and introverted region and the inertia of its political class. When it emerged 
that the St Andrews talks had cost the public purse £400,000—which sounded more 
like prize money for a golf tournament there than reasonable bed and board for a few 
days—Mr Hain was unapologetic: 
The progress made at St Andrews was the catalyst which brought us to the 
truly historic events of this week. The pictures of Ian Paisley and Gerry 
Adams sitting together will resonate around the world and these two leaders 
have demonstrated a shared future for Northern Ireland.
87  
 
A Shared Future, the title of the policy framework on community relations agreed by 
the direct-rule administration—following the failure of the devolved government to act 
on a review of the issue—aims at the transformation of Northern Ireland into a 
‘normal’, civil society. Mr Hain was thus putting something of a spin on the words of 
the two communal principals. At the news conference, Mr Paisley had claimed that 
the period since the DUP had become the largest Protestant party in 2003 had ‘seen 
our strategy deliver very significant advances for the unionist people’, while Mr 




It subsequently emerged that choreography of the Stormont imagery had, among 
other things, been resolved in inter-party talks between SF and DUP subalterns over 
the previous weekend.
89 But not everyone was persuaded that this occasion was 
quite so profound a coming together as was being suggested. Under the cover 
headline ‘Ulster: historic meeting’, Private Eye pictured a smiling Adams with a hurley 




And there were grounds for skepticism, if not such cynicism. Ironically, in one sense 
this was precisely a rerun of the previous apparent Northern Ireland political 
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miracle—the Belfast agreement. In the zero-sum constitutional game, for once in 
1998 the communal protagonists both thought they were winning.  
 
The weekend after Easter that year, Mr Trimble and Mr Adams told specially 
convened party conferences, in Belfast and Dublin respectively, that the Good Friday 
agreement had, in the UUP leader’s version, left the union intact and—
contradictorily—in the view of the SF president, begun a transition to a united 
Ireland.
91 Both could not be right, as would inevitably emerge over time. 
 
As successive iterations of the Northern Ireland Life and Times Survey were to show, 
it was Mr Adams’ view which gradually gained ground. Protestants increasingly saw 
themselves as the communal losers: by 2005, 68 per cent had concluded that the 
agreement had benefited nationalists more than unionists, with only 1 per cent 
believing the contrary and 20 per cent still thinking it had benefited both equally.
92  
 
Mr Trimble meanwhile progressively distanced himself from the post-agreement 
institutions, which collapsed following the revelations of an IRA spy ring at Stormont 
in October 2002, though even that did not save his electoral bacon in 2005. His once-
bitten, twice-shy successor, Sir Reg Empey, acerbically claimed in a BBC Northern 




That was not, of course, how the DUP leader saw it. On the contrary, he wrote a 
gloating opinion piece for a Protestant audience in the News Letter the following 
weekend: 
Monday, March 26, was a day of great victory for the unionist people of 
Northern Ireland. That was the day that republicanism accepted the strength 
of unionism; that was the day that Irish republicanism adhered to our 
demands. That was the day that unionism secured its future.
94
 
A few days later, Mr Paisley told the Belfast Telegraph that SF had, in effect, 
surrendered:  
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They may not admit it, but it is a fact that today they have had to bow the 
knee to the Northern Ireland that they sought to destroy and accept that if 
they want a political role in it they must also accept the parameters of Ulster's 
place in the Union.
95
 
But the SF leadership was unmoved. Its teleological belief in a unitary Irish state 
parallels the old Stalinist faith in the inevitability of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat 
and renders it—and its constituency, as the electoral defeat of the ‘dissidents’ 
proved—immune to such sectarian triumphalism. The future deputy first minister, Mr 
McGuinness told a Co Donegal rally of the faithful commemorating the Easter rising: 
‘We are on a countdown to a united Ireland.’
96  
Mr McGuinness later insisted in an RTE interview, in which he looked forward to SF 
being in government in the republic also, that the next two assembly terms would be 
critical.
97 That would take us to 2015—the SF political elite made clear during the 90
th 
anniversary of the 1916 rising last year that it expected that the centenary would be 
marked in a unitary state.  
The issue of whether Fianna Fáil, dominant party in the current coalition in the 
republic, would countenance coalition with SF had been raised by the former Fine 
Gael taoiseach Garret FitzGerald, who now has a weekly column in the Irish Times, 
with the next Dáil election looming in May. At the turn of the year, the current 
taoiseach and FF leader, Mr Ahern, reiterated in response that he would not go into 
government with SF (though, critically—and this was Dr FitzGerald’s key point—not 
refusing to accept SF votes for his re-election as taoiseach when the new Dáil 
convenes if, as expected, FF and its current coalition allies, the Progressive 
Democrats, fall short of a majority). 
 
The  Irish Times cartoonist, Martyn Turner, drew caricatures of Messrs Blair and 
Ahern trying to woo Mr Paisley into a power-sharing government in the north. He had 
Mr Ahern saying: ‘If you go into government with Sinn Fein you would be 
strengthening partition … ‘cos nobody this side of the border would do such a thing 
…’
98
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Mr Paisley, in any event, begged to differ with his prospective partner in government. 
The conservative Washington Times quoted him as saying: ‘It is quite clear to 
everybody there is going to be no united Ireland for 100 years, at least.’
99
Somebody, once again, is going to find out that they were wrong about the shifting 
ethnic power balance. Mr Adams’ position, ironically, was underpinned during 1998-
2002 by his party’s failure to comply with the decommissioning obligations of the 
agreement. This gave him ‘leverage’ with Downing Street, as Mr Blair admitted in his 
speech in Belfast after the 2002 collapse, in the competitive game between the two 
sets of communalist leaders to extract concessions from the prime minister.
100
 
But with the end to the IRA’s campaign and the decommissioning of its weapons, that 
‘leverage’, which undid Mr Trimble—and, indeed, the SDLP leader, Mr Durkan, 
incensed by the prime minister’s repeated private suggestion that his party’s problem 
was it didn’t have any guns
101—has gone. Conversely, Mr Blair prevented the St 
Andrews talks collapsing in the face of a threatened DUP walk-out, fearing the next 
day’s headlines, by a raft of concessions to that party.
102  
4.2  The Blair legacy 
Around St Patrick’s Day, the Guardian  ran a series of reflections on the Belfast 
agreement and subsequent developments. In it, Mr Mallon, the former deputy first 
minister, was excoriating towards the prime minister, whom he clearly personally 
blames for the polarisation of recent years. Asked if he saw Mr Blair as an honest 
broker, he replied: 
Here was a guy with a moral dimension to everything. And I'm not sure at 
what point I began to realise that in his political dealings he was amoral and 
didn't know the meaning of the word 'honesty'.  
 
… In reality his whole strategy in terms of resolution of the Northern Ireland 
problem—I don't use the term peace process—was 'who do I buy and who do 
I sell'?
103
Asked if peace could have been delivered any other way, Mr Mallon responded: 
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Yes. There was a fundamental misjudgment ... Anyone who knows the north 
of Ireland would not have contemplated actions which sold middle unionism to 
Paisley, just as the same way in which our party [the SDLP] was treated. 
 
That was not, of course, the prime minister’s view. He said of the 26 March events: 
In a sense, everything that we've done over the last 10 years has been a 
preparation for this moment. This won't stop republicans or nationalists being 
any less republican or nationalist, or making unionists any less fiercely 
unionist. But what it does mean is that people can come together, respecting 
each other's point of view, and share power, make sure politics is only 
expressed by peaceful and democratic means.
104
 
Yet the strategic decision by the republican leadership to move to a political 
approach long predated Mr Blair’s ascent to power: Mr Adams was developing the 
‘peace strategy’ from the late 80s.
105 And absent any commitment on either side to 
devolution per se, rather than the antagonistic projects for communal assimilation, it 
will indeed be ‘a battle a day’ until it is again clear which ‘side’ is prevailing—at which 
point there is the real concern that the other will defect. The evidence of the NILTS 
(see public attitudes section), conducted in the aftermath of St Andrews, suggests 
that Catholics are already moving back towards a view which associates devolution 
not with a shared future but with unionist political advantage. 
 
A fortnight after the Stormont event, it emerged that Mr Blair planned to leave 
Downing Street after the Scottish and Welsh elections. It would not, however, be 
directly after those elections, given the anticipated drubbing for Labour, particularly in 
Scotland. It would be a week later, just after the expected re-establishment of 
devolution in Northern Ireland
106—from his point of view, an altogether more media-
friendly association for his retirement. 
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5.   Public Attitudes and Identity 
Lizanne Dowds and Rick Wilford  
5.1   Devolution DUPed? 
The Northern Ireland Life and Times Survey regularly includes a question on the 
constitutional preferences of the public, and the 2006 survey allows us to gauge 
public opinion after the St Andrew’s agreement and before the March 2007 assembly 
election. The question includes various constitutional possibilities for Northern 
Ireland, from independence to unification with the republic, and asks respondents 
about their own views.  
 
As noted in the May 2006 report,
107 between 2001 and 2005 public opinion 
surrounding basic constitutional preferences was remarkably stable. Support for 
devolution grew, while independence for Northern Ireland remained unpopular. The 
greatest support among the Catholic community was for a united Ireland, but this 
dropped as support for devolution steadily increased. By 2005, nearly as many 
Catholics favoured devolution as unification.  
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Figure 1: Changing Constitutional Preferences 2001-2006 
 
  2001 2003 2005 2006 
All  % % % % 
Northern Ireland should become…      
Independent  10 9 11 6 
Devolution  43 52 52 57 
  Remain part of the UK with own Parliament  (31)  (30)  (31)  (42) 
  Remain part of the UK with own Assembly  (12)  (22)  (21)  (16) 
Remain part of the UK with no Assembly  13  12  10  5 
Unify with the Republic of Ireland  21  17  17  23 
Don’t  know  13 11 10  9 
      
Protestants      
Northern Ireland should become…      
Independent 8  6  10  5 
Devolution  65 68 66 81 
  Remain part of the UK with own Parliament  (47)  (37)  (39)  (59) 
  Remain part of the UK with own Assembly  (18)  (31)  (27)  (22) 
Remain part of the UK with no Assembly  17  17  15  6 
Unify with the Republic of Ireland  1  2  1  2 
Don’t  know  9 7 8 5 
 
 
    
Catholics      
Northern Ireland should become…      
Independent  13 12 12  7 
Devolution  18 27 35 29 
  Remain part of the UK with own Parliament  (14)  (18)  (23)  (22) 
  Remain part of the UK with own Assembly  (4)  (9)  (12)  (8) 
Remain part of the UK with no Assembly  7  7  3  3 
Unify with the Republic of Ireland  49  38  39  48 
Don’t  know  13 15 10 13 
 
The most popular choice for Protestants was always devolution, with about two-thirds 
of Protestant respondents over the 2001-05 period consistently endorsing the option 
in some form. Only 15 per cent of Protestants at the end of 2005 would have opted 
for direct rule as their first choice. 
 
But the results from the 2006 survey reveal interesting changes. Possibly public 
opinion perceives some ‘tweaking’ of political arrangements in favour of the 
Protestant community ‘over’ the Catholic community. Certainly Catholic support for 
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unification with the republic has risen, just as support for devolution has suddenly 
waned. Among the Protestant community, support for devolution has strengthened 
further to a massive 81 per cent, with support for independence or direct rule 
negligible.  
 
Among the population overall, this balances out to a slight to moderate increase in 
support for devolution, with a moderate increase in support for unification. For the 
time being at least, support for independence and direct rule is at an all-time low. 
Devolution remains the most popular option and not since 2001 has it had less than 
50 per cent support across Northern Ireland.  
 
One final point worth mentioning is that among both communities, and across the 
entire period, the option of devolution with Northern Ireland having its own parliament 
has always been much more popular than devolution with only an elected assembly. 
Consensus such as this is rare. 
5.2 Mood  of  méfiance 
Only one poll was published during the election campaign.
108 This forecast a 25 per 
cent vote share for the DUP, 22 per cent for SF, 20 per cent for the SDLP and 16 per 
cent for the UUP. The poll was accurate only in so far as the rankings were right. It 
did exert some effect, however, especially on the DUP.  
 
Pointing to the narrow 3 per cent gap between that party and SF (within the margin of 
error), its election supremo, the deputy leader, Mr Robinson, warned Protestant 
voters that staying at home or supporting ‘maverick’ unionist candidates could gift the 
role of first minister to SF, since the post would fall to the largest party, rather than 
the largest party in the largest ‘designation’ (‘unionist’/’nationalist’/’other’), as had 
been the case in 1998 and at the 2003 virtual election: 
It is obvious that if the traditional pattern of a higher percentage of nationalists 
than unionists coming out to vote were even to marginally increase it would 
have dire consequences. Adams and McGuinness would travel the world 
purporting to speak on behalf of NI; Martin McGuinness would be proposed 
as First Minister; and nationalists would be in a majority in any Executive … It 
is vital that unionist voters turn out … and support the DUP… and make sure 
that SF does not become the largest party.
109
 
                                                  
108 Ipsos/MORI poll, Belfast Telegraph (1 March 2007). 
109 DUP news release, 2 March 2007. 
45 Northern Ireland Devolution Monitoring Report    April 2007 
However highly motivated the poll’s respondents were, only one in four believed that 
the prospective Paisley/McGuinness pairing as first and deputy first ministers would 
work either ‘well’ or ‘very well’ (a view held by 23 per cent of Protestants and 27 per 
cent of Catholics). Overall, 64 per cent of respondents said that the DUP and SF 
figures would work together not very well (37 per cent) or not at all (27 per cent), a 
view shared by Protestants (63 per cent) and Catholics (62 per cent). 
 
Respondents were also ambivalent about the likelihood that the election would lead 
to the return of a working assembly and executive. Only half of all intending voters 
thought it likely (including 50 per cent of Protestants and 53 per cent of Catholics) 
while one in three (34 per cent) thought it unlikely, with a further 10 per cent 
undecided and 5 per cent who didn’t know. Asked what should happen if devolution 
was not restored by the deadline of 26 March, respondents were unequivocal: by a 
margin of three to one (74 per cent to 23 per cent), they wanted the salaries of the 
MLAs to be halted immediately (including 73 per cent of Protestants and 74 per cent 
of Catholics).  
 
As if to confirm the electorate’s ‘a plague on all your houses’ mood, when asked how 
favourably they felt towards leading politicians, all registered a higher negative rating: 
ranging from -37 per cent for Mr Hain, to -35 per cent for Mr Blair, -34 per cent for Mr 
Adams and -30 per cent for Mr Paisley. For the second time the British or Irish 
politician with the least negative rating was Mr Ahern (-8 per cent). Predictably, the 
ratings varied between Protestants and Catholics.  
 
Among the latter, Mr Paisley emerged as the least popular with a rating of -69 per 
cent and Mr Ahern as the most popular with a positive rating of +25 per cent, ahead 
of Mr Adams (+18 per cent) and Mr Durkan (+8 per cent). Among Protestants, only 
Mr Paisley and Sir Reg Empey emerged with positive ratings, in the former’s case a 
miserly +5 per cent, and in the latter’s an even punier +1 per cent. Protestant voters 
know whom they dislike the most, however: Mr Adams, with a -72 per cent rating, 
well ahead of Mr Blair (-48 per cent) and Mr Hain (-43 per cent). They were less ill-
disposed to the taoiseach, who emerged with a negative rating of -36 per cent. 
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6.   Intergovernmental Relations  
Elizabeth Meehan and Robin Wilson 
6.1 ‘East-west’ 
The main ‘east-west’ events of the period were the high politics dealt with elsewhere 
in this monitoring report. This section includes a report on the British-Irish Inter-
Parliamentary Body (BIIPB). While this took place in the previous reporting period, 
the record was not available at the time of the last report—though a response, tabled 
at that meeting, by the Home Office to the body’s concerns about the common travel 
area and identity cards was available and reported upon. The now-published minutes 
of the October BIIPB meeting show that Committee A (Sovereign Matters) believes 
there are still issues that need to be followed up.
110  
 
A further BIIPB meeting was held in Dublin in March 2007 but the official record was 
not available at time of writing.
111 During that meeting, the presiding officer of the 
Scottish Parliament, George Reid, gave a very well received address to the Royal 
Irish Academy about the external roles of the devolved institutions. 
 
The meeting held on 23-24 October 2006 at the Waterfront Hall in Belfast was 
another historic occasion (the previous one being the DUP’s attendance at Killarney 
in April 2006). In opening the October meeting, the British co-chair, Paul Murphy, 
noted that it was the first time the body had met formally in Northern Ireland. He 
remembered being in the Waterfront Hall, as a very new minister, for its inauguration 
by Prince Charles in 1997. During the opening symphony, he was told a bomb had 
gone off in the law courts opposite and he was ‘whisked away’. He drew attention to 
the enormous changes, not only since 1997, but also since the time ‘when Peter 
Brooke was here and started the whole the process off’.
112
 
His fellow co-chair, Pat Carey TD, shared the sense of history and pleasure in the 
venue, noting that it was ‘no secret that there [had] been a number of unsuccessful 
                                                  
110 Official Report of Thirty-Third Plenary Conference, 23-24 October 2006: British-Irish Inter-
Parliamentary Body Reporting Association, p. 63. 
111 This will be covered in the next monitoring report. 
112 Official Report of Thirty-Third Plenary Conference, 23-24 October 2006: British-Irish Inter-
Parliamentary Body Reporting Association, p. 1. The sentiment was echoed by Senator Martin 
Mansergh, p. 25. 
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attempts to hold a meeting’ in Belfast.
113 Iain Smith, the Scottish MSP for the 
constituency that contains St Andrews, also drew attention to a historical contrast. 
When he attended his first BIIPB meeting in Donegal in 2000, he was ‘taken aback’ 
to find an armed guard outside his hotel bedroom door; in Belfast, just a few years 
later, there was ’barely a policeman to be seen’.
114
 
The St Andrews agreement dominated the debate on a motion on economic 
regeneration and political progress and much of the discussion was, understandably, 
speculative. For obvious reasons, St Andrews was also the main topic of the address 
(later in the day) by the Northern Ireland secretary, Mr Hain.
115  
 
As to other significant matters discussed by the BIIPB, corporation tax figured 
heavily
116 in the opening session, and in a later session on the economic situation, 
with addresses by the former Ulster Bank chair Sir George Quigley and Peter 
Bunting of the Irish Congress of Trade Unions. A young Northern Ireland 
entrepreneur, Adam Ewart, completed the discussion panel. Later in the day, during 
questions to the Northern Ireland secretary, the topic was again raised—by Lord 
Dubs. All the major parties in Northern Ireland are in favour of harmonising 
corporation tax with the lower rate (of 12.5 per cent) applied south of the border. But 
although, a few months later, the chancellor of the exchequer was to launch a 
commission on the topic (see finance section), the secretary of state responded 
negatively to the idea —less on the basis of EU rules and more in terms of equity in 




During discussion of the motion mentioned above, there was speculation about the 
future of the BIIPB under any new dispensation arising from St Andrews. Michael 
Mates MP, who opened the debate, noted that paragraph 24 of the St Andrews 
                                                  
113 Official Report of Thirty-Third Plenary Conference, 23-24 October 2006: British-Irish Inter-
Parliamentary Body Reporting Association, pp. 2-3. 
114 Official Report of Thirty-Third Plenary Conference, 23-24 October 2006: British-Irish Inter-
Parliamentary Body Reporting Association, p. 24. 
115 Official Report of Thirty-Third Plenary Conference, 23-24 October 2006: British-Irish Inter-
Parliamentary Body Reporting Association, pp. 47-51. 
116 Reservations were however expressed by Mr Bunting, supported later by some delegates. He said 
this was just one part of a whole range of socio-economic problems and inequalities—Official Report of 
Thirty-Third Plenary Conference, 23-24 October 2006: British-Irish Inter-Parliamentary Body Reporting 
Association, pp. 9 (Bunting), 29 (Arthur Morgan, TD). 
117 Official Report of Thirty-Third Plenary Conference, 23-24 October 2006: British-Irish Inter-
Parliamentary Body Reporting Association, pp. 58-9. 
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agreement indicated the possibility of a new footing for the body.
118 That is, the two 
governments, in consultation with the BIIPB, would encourage politicians of the new 
elected bodies to approve an East-West Parliamentary Framework that would 
operate on an inclusive basis. He looked to the DUP to begin to offer some concrete 
commitment, following its assurance at the Killarney meeting in April 2006 that it 
would be willing to participate in such a framework when it was ‘perched on the right 
tree’.
119 He also called upon the Steering Committee to bring forward proposals to the 
next meeting of the BIIPB on how to advance the suggestion in the agreement and to 
ensure inclusiveness. 
 
The status of the body recurred in questions by several members to the secretary of 
state.
120 Mr Mates pressed Mr Hain about when a proposal would be likely and when 
consultation with the BIIPB would take place. Mr Hain lobbed the ball back into the 
body’s court, suggesting that it should put forward ideas and proposals. Before that, 
Lord Smith, with previous discussions in mind about the relationship between the 
BIIPB and the British-Irish Council, had asked whether the body would be put on a 
statutory basis and its presiding officers enabled to attend meetings of the BIC.  
 
The Northern Ireland secretary said that he had received no proposal to link the BIC 
and BIIPB and gave reasons for doubting whether a statutory footing would be 
helpful. He said it was not envisaged that the BIIPB would be mentioned in the 
forthcoming emergency bill to give effect to the St Andrews agreement. (This became 
the Northern Ireland (St Andrews Agreement) Act 2006 and, indeed, it does not refer 
to the BIIPB.) The relationship of the BIIPB to the BIC was presented in the next 
day’s Report from Committee A (Sovereign Affairs) as a matter of urgency.
121
 
A novel proposal was made by Andrew Mackinley MP, that the chairs
122 of the BIIPB 
or reconstituted east-west parliamentary framework should be able to attend 
‘ministerial bodies on behalf of the parliamentary arm’. He noted that in the European 
                                                  
118 Official Report of Thirty-Third Plenary Conference, 23-24 October 2006: British-Irish Inter-
Parliamentary Body Reporting Association, pp. 19-20.  His views were endorsed by Senator Brendan 
Ryan, p.31, and Jim O’Keeffe, TD, p. 35. 
119 E. Meehan in R. Wilford and R. Wilson (eds.), Northern Ireland Devolution Monitoring Report: 
September 2006, at: 
 www.ucl.ac.uk/constitution-unit/research/devolution/MonReps/NI_Sept06.pdf, p.40. 
120 Official Report of Thirty-Third Plenary Conference, 23-24 October 2006: British-Irish Inter-
Parliamentary Body Reporting Association, Official Report of Thirty-Third Plenary Conference, 23-24 
October 2006: British-Irish Inter-Parliamentary Body Reporting Association, pp. 54-56. 
121 Official Report of Thirty-Third Plenary Conference, 23-24 October 2006: British-Irish Inter-
Parliamentary Body Reporting Association, p. 63. 
122 He also suggested abandoning the use of ‘co-chairman’, a formulation already abandoned in these 
monitoring reports in favour of ‘c-chair(s)’! 
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Union, the Council of Europe and the Organisation for Security and Co-operation, the 
heads of parliamentary arms attended on a party basis. He felt this would add to the 
status of the BIIPB by encouraging ministers in the north and south to see 
themselves as answerable to the body and by edging it out of the ‘disproportionate 
influence’ of the Northern Ireland Office— ‘and probably the Irish Foreign Ministry’.
123
 
In the afternoon of the first day, plenary debate moved to the topic of civil society, 
during which the body was addressed by Patricia McKeown (ICTU), Duncan Morrow 
(Community Relations Council) and Michael Wardlow (Northern Ireland Council for 
Integrated Education). All gave very powerful presentations, greatly appreciated by 
BIIPB members.
124 Notable in the presentations and the questions, as well as in 
passing references elsewhere in the meeting, was a marked shift in perception of 
demography in Northern Ireland and its consequences.  
 
In the past, observers of the conflict have sometimes sounded irritated by the 
‘narcissism of small differences’ that has provided an ‘excuse’ for horrendous social 
and cultural relations. The recent inward migration has made Northern Ireland more 
similar to its neighbours. Its extent and diversity and the horrendous things that 
happen to migrants featured significantly in the discussions of both civil society and 
political mobilisation. Here, again, the EU figured. Helen Eadie MSP asked Ms 
McKeown whether she set much store by article 19 of the EU Public Procurement 
Directive for enhancing employment opportunities for the disabled. Ms McKeown said 
‘it was dear to her heart’, enabling legislation in Northern Ireland to tackle inequality 
among nine categories of person, including the disabled.
125  
 
A range of other issues was addressed by the body. That they are not all dealt with 
here is not a reflection of their importance (eg ‘a shared future’ and the difficulties 
facing young people in north and west Belfast
126) but arises because the report 
concentrates on those that are not exclusively internal or north-south. These other 
issues included: east-west transport links, which were raised in passing throughout 
                                                  
123 Official Report of Thirty-Third Plenary Conference, 23-24 October 2006: British-Irish Inter-
Parliamentary Body Reporting Association, pp. 21-22. 
124 Official Report of Thirty-Third Plenary Conference, 23-24 October 2006: British-Irish Inter-
Parliamentary Body Reporting Association, pp. 36-47. 
125 Official Report of Thirty-Third Plenary Conference, 23-24 October 2006: British-Irish Inter-
Parliamentary Body Reporting Association, pp. 45-6. 
126 Report on Life Chances from Committee D (Environmental and Social), Official Report of Thirty-Third 
Plenary Conference, 23-24 October 2006: British-Irish Inter-Parliamentary Body Reporting Association, 
pp. 65-73. The report had been sent, with agreement, to Northern Ireland ministers prior to formal 
endorsement by the BIIPB in the light of a package announced by government earlier in the year.   
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the meeting and specifically in respect of Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales;
127 
harmonised conditions for free travel for the elderly, not only between north and 
south but also for Irish emigrants in Great Britain visiting Ireland;
128 student fees, not 
only in terms of a preference for north-south parity, but also raising the question of 
why Northern Ireland could not diverge from England as Scotland has;
129 ways of 
adapting the British census to measure the Irish community in Britain more 
accurately; and difficulties facing elderly Irish people living in Britain who wish to 
return to Ireland.
130   
6.2   North-south 
There were a number of technocratic developments in terms of north-south co-
operation during the period. In January, the economy minister, Maria Eagle, and the 
republic’s minister for communications, marine and natural resources, Noel 
Dempsey, reaffirmed their goal of achieving an all-island energy market by 
November, with the long-term aspiration of a ‘these islands’ market with an 




Also that month, the republic’s government published the latest iteration of its 
‘national development plan’. This devoted to north-south investment about €1 billion 
as part of what was a €184 billion, seven-year plan. The document mainly recapped 
the by now extensive capillary networks of co-operation straddling the border over a 
range of policy domains, rather than promising extensive new initiatives.
132  
 
Shortly afterwards, the Northern Ireland secretary, Mr Hain, announced joint funding 
with the republic of £14 million runway works at Derry airport. And in February, the 
NIO junior minister David Hanson addressed an All Island Infrastructure Conference 
in Newcastle, Co Down. Mr Hanson said that, given the National Development Plan 
and the corresponding Strategic Investment Plan in the north, ‘the necessity for a co-
                                                  
127 Report from Committee C (Economic), Official Report of Thirty-Third Plenary Conference, 23-24 
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The uneasy contradiction between the emphasis on roads and air travel in north-
south co-operation on transport and the sustainable-development strategy to which 
the Northern Ireland administration is committed has not yet been noted. But the next 
day, the taoiseach, Mr Ahern, accompanied by Seamus Brennan, the republic’s 
minister for social and family affairs, and David Cairns from the NIO, launched the all-




More politically contentious was a proposal by the republic’s government to establish 
a committee on implementation of north-south co-operation in the context of the 
Belfast agreement, which would include MPs as well as members of the Oireachtas 
(the Dáil and Seanad). This raised concern not only in unionist quarters but among 
opposition parties in the republic. The UUP claimed this would breach the 
agreement’s constitutional provisions, while the (Irish) Labour party noted that SF 
had heard about it first, and queried whether there had been a ‘side deal’ following 
the previous retreat by the government on the issue, pressed by SF, of Dáil speaking 
rights for northern MPs.
135
 
But the major political event on the north-south axis was the first public, indeed 
ebullient, handshake offered by Mr Paisley to any taoiseach when he met Mr Ahern 
in Dublin. It was a far cry from the occasion when he stood in the grounds of 
Stormont to throw snowballs at the then taoiseach, Jack Lynch, during a visit to the 
then Northern Ireland premier, Terence O’Neill, in the late 60s.
136 But the effect was 
somewhat undermined by a BBC interview later, in which he said he had been forced 
into power-sharing with SF on pain of ‘joint government by the south of Ireland’.
137
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7.   Relations with the EU   
Elizabeth Meehan 
7.1   Introduction 
The main news about the connections between devolution and the EU in this period 
came from Scotland rather than Northern Ireland, but there were implications for a 
restored Northern Ireland executive.  
 
It has been reported previously that Scotland has been more assiduous than was the 
Northern Ireland executive while devolution was functioning about getting its voice 
heard in Brussels. To some surprise, however, a leaked report by Michael Aron, 
head of the Scottish Executive Office in Brussels (previously a UK official in 
Brussels), claimed that Scottish ministers and officials were regularly, sometimes 
deliberately, ‘kept out of the loop’ by the UK government. This sometimes had a 
‘disastrous’ effect on Scottish Executive policy.
138 The Scottish experience implies 
the need for a new Northern Ireland executive to be stronger than it was, and 
stronger than Scotland is, in taking every opportunity to pursue its interests in 
Brussels.  
 
Indeed, Mr Aron went so far as to recommend to the first minister, Jack McConnell, 
that he lobby the European Commission directly. Another implication lay in Mr Aron’s 
observation that the ‘diminishing role of the Secretary of State for Scotland has 
meant that there is no longer a hard hitting voice within cabinet meetings speaking 
out on behalf of Scotland’s interests’. Add to this the further conflict of interests that 
could arise from the fact that Mr Hain is secretary of state for both Northern Ireland 
and Wales. Finally, the Scottish National Party claimed that the report vindicated 
everything it had ever said about ‘Scottish misrepresentation in Europe’. At least in 
Northern Ireland there is the, as yet untried, provision of the agreement for the 
North/South Ministerial Council to think of alternative or additional ways for promoting 
Northern Ireland’s interests in the EU. 
 
In the meantime, constitutional questions were also at stake in the Northern Ireland 
issues for the period: crown employment and nationality, and EU funding. 
                                                  
138 The report by Mr Aron was addressed to the first minister, Jack McConnell, and written in September 
2006. It was leaked in January 2007 at the 300
th anniversary of the events leading to the Treaty of 
Union, and reported and commented upon in the Herald (27 January 2007), pp. 1, 2 and 12. 
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7.2   Crown employment and nationality  
Previous reports have referred to the complicated—and controversial—relationships 
among the different rules governing access to public-service positions for 
Commonwealth and Irish nationals in Great Britain, access to public-sector posts in 
Northern Ireland for people born outside the region (particularly Irish nationals) and 
access for all EU nationals to crown employment throughout the UK. Orders in the 
1990s to secure compliance with EU regulations had the effect of reducing the rights 
of Irish and Commonwealth nationals in Great Britain, without enhancing the rights of 
Irish nationals in Northern Ireland.  
 
The continued exclusion of Irish nationals from a range of posts in Northern Ireland 
was a matter of concern to SDLP members of the Northern Ireland Executive 
Committee before and after the suspension of devolution, and it was on the agenda 
of the British-Irish Intergovernmental Conference in 2006. The problem rumbles on. 
In October 2006, a question about it by a member of the BIIB to the Northern Ireland 
secretary, Mr Hain, was ducked.
139  
 
In December, Andrew Dismore MP reintroduced—for the fifth time—his private 
member’s bill to open or reopen a wide range of civil-service positions to non-UK 
nationals, save for particular posts to which a minister of the crown, or person to 
whom power had been delegated, might attach a nationality requirement.
140 Mr 
Dismore, as a London MP, is particularly concerned that 350,000 people—9 per cent 
of the city’s working population—are excluded, ‘not just from the higher ranks of the 
civil service, but from applying for even the most junior social security clerk’s job’.
141 
But his bill is intended to apply to Northern Ireland, as well as Great Britain. It was 
due for its second reading on 29 June 2007.  
 
In the meantime and in anticipation of an order-in-council which could pre-empt Mr 
Dismore’s bill, the former UUP leader, Lord Trimble (allegedly a source of opposition 
during previous tablings), asked a question on 30 January 2007 about the 
government’s obligations under European law. He told the minister, Lord Davies, that 
the NIO claimed that EU legislation required posts from which EU nationals were 
                                                  
139 Senator Pascal Mooney—Official Report of Thirty-Third Plenary Conference, 23-24 October 2006: 
British-Irish Inter-Parliamentary Body Reporting Association, p. 60. 
140 Crown Employment (nationality) Bill 38-EN. 
141 See www.ePolitix.com, 18 December 2006.  
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excluded because of the requirement for ‘special allegiance to the state’ to be 
opened up to Irish nationals. He said that it had been agreed at St Andrews that this 
would not be the case in Northern Ireland: 
The Northern Ireland Civil Service is small with little interchange with the rest 
of the United Kingdom, but it has nevertheless maintained its ethos and 
integrity during difficult times. As it now faces a unique challenge in its future 
political masters, this is not the time for competition with a larger body which 
does not share the same ethos, particularly on political independence. Nor 
would such a change be consistent with the Good Friday agreement. 
 
He went on to invite the minister to agree that ‘the parachuting in of Ministers with no 
organic connection with Northern Ireland society should not now be replaced by 




Lord Davies assured Lord Trimble that the post of permanent secretary would be a 
reserved one. But while he recognised the implications for Northern Ireland, what 
was at stake was the ability of the British civil service ‘to tap into the pool of talent 
represented by those from other countries who [had] the right to live and work here’. 
He noted that certain posts, such as those in the Security Service, would necessarily 
be reserved for British nationals.
143 While Lord Trimble’s personal contribution to 
Northern Ireland was honoured, comments by other peers were, with one exception, 
at one with Lord Davies’ sentiments—taking a UK-wide perspective.
144
7.3 EU  funding 
At the end of 2006, ‘heavy lobbying by DARD [Department for Agriculture and 
Regional Development], Northern Ireland MEPs and other stakeholders’, led the 
European Commission to agree to extend the Farm Nutrient Management Scheme 
(offering 60 per cent grant to assist compliance with the Nitrates Directive Action 
Plan) by two years until the end of December 2008.
145  
 
                                                  
142 HL Deb, 30 January 2007, col. 121. The opposite to the view expressed in the last sentence was 
offered by Seán Farren MLA, who, just before the fall of devolution,  commissioned a review, and his 
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Agreement was also secured on a third phase of funding for the Special Support 
Programme for Peace and Reconciliation—‘Peace III’. This amounts to about €300 
million, running from 2007 to 2013. It was achieved despite the fact of enlargement 
by twelve new member states in three years, which, as Brian Cowen, the republic’s 
finance minister, noted, included countries undergoing ‘significant political and 
economic change’.
146 On 15 January 2007, he and David Hanson, his direct-rule 
counterpart, welcomed the launch of a consultation to ask people in Northern Ireland 
and the border counties of the republic for their suggestions about how to spend the 
new money.
147 The consultation, which ended on 3 April 2007, was carried out by the 
Special EU Programmes Body, one of the north-south implementation bodies 
established after the Belfast agreement.  
 
The European Parliament, however, is a little less happy about one aspect of funding 
for reconciliation in Northern Ireland and the border counties. A meeting of its 
Committee on Legal Affairs, on 26-27 February 2007, unanimously recommended to 
the parliament’s president that an action for annulment be lodged with the European 
Court of Justice against the Council of Ministers, for its failure to use the co-decision 




It is not yet clear if the recommendation will be followed by the president of the 
Parliament, but this would normally be the case according to Jamie Smyth of the Irish 
Times.
149 The same source also recorded that all members of the Council of 
Ministers, including the republic, had refused to accept a report on funding by the 
Fine Gael MEP Jim Higgins, which included a recommendation that MEPs should 
exercise co-decision powers over the IFI grant. Mr Higgins defended the action of the 
EP Committee on Legal Affairs. Nevertheless, neither he nor a Fianna Fáil member 
of the committee, Brian Crowley, nor the republic’s government thought the legal 
challenge would affect the timing of the funding commitment. 
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7.4 Conclusion 
With respect to Mr Cowen’s comment about new member states that could be said to 
be needier, and bearing in mind the ‘sweeteners’ sought from the chancellor by 
Northern Ireland politicians to ease the path to renewed devolution, it is perhaps 
worth noting Andy Pollak’s experience at a conference of cross-border co-operators 
at the end of 2006. There, most people thought what was happening on the island of 
Ireland was ‘an inspiring example’ but, to Mr Pollak, it was questionable whether the 
accolade was deserved. Between 2004 and 2006, he observed, Northern Ireland and 
the Irish border region ‘received nearly seven times the amount received by our 
impoverished fellow-Europeans in the Baltic region’
150.  
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8.   Relations with Local Government   
Robin Wilson 
 
One potential effect of the re-establishment of devolved government in May is the 
reopening of the review of public administration, launched by the previous devolved 
administration and associated with a reduction in the number of public authorities at 
sub-regional level, including councils. The RPA team had recommended, and the 
NIO accepted, a culling of the existing 26 district councils to seven.
151  
 
But this was an approach which only found favour, among the parties, with the 
instinctively centralist SF—though the others could have been accused of protecting 
the stratum of councillors under the banner of preserving ‘local identity’. In any event, 
the issue is once more up for grabs and is likely to be one of a number on which the 
DUP and SF quickly lock horns.  
 
According to a Department of Environment insider, the expectation is of nothing 
emerging from government, even for consultation, until late this year. And this would 
put off the expected introduction of the new local authorities from 2009 to 2011.  
 
Meantime, other aspects of the reforms arising from the review trundled on, including 
a reduction of the number of health trusts from 18 to five. In January 2007, the health 
minister, Paul Goggins, opened a consultation on legislation for the health aspect of 
the RPA,




The four area health-and-social-services boards are also to be replaced by one 
central authority. So the overall result is a significant loss of jobs in the region’s major 
employer. Indeed, during the reporting period, the Department of Health, Social 
Services and Public Safety permanent secretary, Andrew McCormick, said the 
number of clerical, managerial and executive jobs to be lost through health-service 
reorganisation would be about double the previous estimate at some 1,700. But he 
insisted this would mean £50 million would be diverted to service provision and said 
                                                  
151 R. Wilford and R. Wilson (eds.), Northern Ireland Devolution Monitoring Report: January 2006, pp. 
45-9. 
152 Department of Health, Social Services and Public Safety news release, 16 January 2007 
153 DHSSPS news release, 22 March 2007. 
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One goal of the review of public administration was to bring about coterminosity of 
public bodies, which will be critical to making a success of the new process of 
community planning, organised around the reformed local authorities. But if the 
number of councils is raised to eleven or fifteen, as the other parties would wish, not 
only will the powers to be transferred have to be revisited but they will no longer be 
coterminous with the local health and social care commissioning groups, whose 
number was set at seven precisely for that purpose. 
 
Education, too, is affected by the reorganisation, with the abolition of the five 
education-and-library boards in favour, here again, of a single regional authority. The 
Catholic Church has campaigned against this change, associated with the removal of 
its employment role vis-à-vis teachers in ‘maintained’ (Catholic) schools. Adopting a 
courageous stance, the Irish National Teachers’ Organisation, representing mainly 
maintained-school teachers, challenged the church’s stance, calling instead for it to 
endorse ‘a shared future’ for the region’s schoolchildren.
155
 
                                                  
154 C. Regan, ‘Health service to axe 1,700 jobs’, Belfast Telegraph (30 March 2007) 
155 K. Torney, ‘Call off campaign against change, teachers urge bishops’, Belfast Telegraph (13 January, 
2007). 
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9.   Finance   
Rick Wilford and Robin Wilson 
9.1   Asking for more 
In the wake of the assembly election, the parties beat a path to the Treasury on the 
day after the budget, seeking a financial package from the chancellor to reward them 
(potentially) for swallowing the power-sharing pill, especially bitter for the DUP. It was 
an unedifying sight—to play fast and loose with Dickens, it was rather like a gaggle of 
Oliver Twists meeting Gradgrind.  
 
The outcome was the offer of £1 billion or, rather, £600 million, supplemented by the 
promise of £400 million from the republic’s government, designed to assist in bridging 
the infrastructural deficit created by the neglect of the direct-rule administrations—if, 
that is, the DUP and SF agreed to establish the executive. Indeed, on closer 
inspection, it was even less: £200 million was simply assumed to be obtainable from 
end-of-year flexibility,
156 and a further £200 million was to come from the sell-off of 
public assets.
157 These modest extra resources, just £200 million net, would 
complement the at-first-glance huge package of £50 billion, announced by the 
chancellor in the wake of the St Andrews agreement. But this turned out to be a 
combination of much smoke and some mirrors, and not to represent any new 
financial commitments at all.
158  
 
Gordon Brown was even less receptive to the proposal, shared by the parties, to 
lower corporation tax in Northern Ireland to the same level as that applied in the 
republic, ie to vary UK fiscal policy, though he did offer to establish a review led by 
Sir David Varney, former head of Revenue and Customs. Given his background, it 
appeared unlikely that Sir David had been selected to propose a break-up of the 
unitary UK taxation system.  
 
The Northern Ireland secretary, Mr Hain, was quick to insist that it would be 
impossible to vary corporation tax in Northern Ireland following the European Court of 
                                                  
156 N. McAdam, ‘Brown offers £1bn package to parties’, Belfast Telegraph (22 March 2007). 
157 R. Morton, ‘New doubts raised over Chancellor’s £1bn package’, Belfast Telegraph (16 April 2007). 
158 This was essentially a projection of existing expenditure plans, assuming Labour remained in office 
at Westminster. See R. Wilford and R. Wilson (eds), Northern Ireland Devolution Monitoring Report: 
January 2007, at http://www.ucl.ac.uk/constitution-unit/research/devolution/MonReps/NI_Jan07.pdf, p. 
51. 
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Justice judgment on a case involving the Azores islands.
159 And, on this wider 
European canvas, it has gone entirely unnoticed in Northern Ireland that the republic 
is under increasing pressure from France and Germany to end its corporation-tax 
shelter, now that it is an affluent rather than an impoverished member state.  
 
The parties were equally resolved to persuade the UK government to defer the 
introduction of water charges (with the bills planned to land on the doorsteps during 
the first week in April), if not reduce them, against the promise that if devolution was 
to occur final decisions on the charges would become a matter for the re-devolved 
assembly. The bills were duly postponed (see ‘peace-process’ section). 
 
The immediate reaction among the parties to the meeting at 11 Downing Street was 
that the offer represented ‘modest progress’ but that much remained to be 
accomplished. 
9.2   Taking decisions 
Meantime, the direct-rule administration went on with making decisions. In March, the 
environment minister, Paul Goggins, announced a £122 million public-private 
partnership contract to upgrade a number of waste treatment facilities. He highlighted 
how Northern Ireland had not reached the 95 per cent compliance with EU standards 




The finance minister, David Hanson, had earlier announced the regional rate 
increases following the laying of the relevant order at Westminster.
161 The first bills 
under the new system, based on capital value, would see a 6 per cent increase on 
2006-07, continuing the above-average trend under devolution and since, making up 
for the poor ‘fiscal effort’ by the region in previous years.
162  
 
Perversely, but following pressure from the DUP in particular, in the wake of the 26 
March decision on the renewal of devolution, Mr Hanson announced a cap on rates 
for properties valued at more than £500,000, which will mean poorer ratepayers 
                                                  
159 M. Hookham, ‘Corporation tax will not be slashed’, Belfast Telegraph (30 March 2007). 
160 Department for Regional Development news release, 12 March 2007. 
161 DFP news release, 9 February 2007. 
162 D. Heald, Funding the Northern Ireland Assembly: Addressing the Options (Belfast: Northern Ireland 
Economic Council, 2003, at: www.erini.ac.uk/Publications/PDF/Healdfinalpaper2.pdf).  
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paying more than they otherwise would. He also announced a 50 per cent easement 
for elderly people on low incomes.
163  
 
The decision to cap rate payments for the owners of expensive homes looks even 
odder in the face of the windfall gains available to property owners—and the bigger 
the property, the bigger the potential windfall—following the rapid rise in house prices 
in Northern Ireland in recent years. The ‘peace dividend’ which European Union 
funding has sought to steer towards disadvantaged areas has been massively 
captured by the region’s established middle class. 
 
Halifax data show the value of houses in Northern Ireland has risen by 165 per cent 
since 2001—the highest of any UK region.
164 Indeed, the Royal Institution of 
Chartered Surveyors European Housing Review found that the increases in 2006 




Unsurprisingly, data from the Northern Ireland Housing Executive, which has 
strategic responsibility for housing in the region, revealed rising homelessness, as 
fewer could get on to the receding bottom rung of the housing ladder and nearly 
16,000 households were in ‘housing stress’ on the social-housing waiting list.
166 
Northern Ireland’s high poverty rate, arising from low employment and low pay, has 
hitherto been offset by low housing costs.
167
 
In March, the Department for Social Development announced that private tenancies 
deemed fit would no longer be subject to rent control. And the following month the 
Department for Social Development published a review of housing affordability by a 
former head of the civil service, Sir John Semple, which proposed a number of 
modest measures to tackle the problem.
168  
 
But only a much greater investment in social housing than Sir John recommended 
would tackle the growing crisis for some very vulnerable people, who have also had 
                                                  
163 DFP news release, 30 March 2007.  
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to cope in recent months with rising fuel costs and who face the eventual prospect of 
water charges—albeit capped at 3 per cent of income for poor households—as well. 
In its absence, allowing the private sector to find its own rent level would be more 
likely to lead to profit-taking by existing landlords through rent inflation than 
investment in new properties adding sufficient supply to bring rents down. 
 
Also in March, with the education brief, Maria Eagle appeared to accommodate 
conservative Northern Ireland interests when she gave the go-ahead for the vast 
majority of school-building schemes—84, costing £580 million—that had been held 
up by the independent Bain report, commissioned by the Northern Ireland secretary, 
Mr Hain, on the rationalisation of the schools estate.
169 Ms Eagle said eight projects 
would depend on congruence being established with the area-based approach to 




Given that the building programme had been described by a source close to the 
Northern Ireland secretary as ‘a work of fiction’ in advance of Bain, this suggested 
the Department of Education, which has gone with the grain of segregated schooling 
in Northern Ireland for decades, had ensured its effects would be limited. In 
December, Ms Eagle had turned down five projects for new integrated schools.
171
 
The post-Bain debate in Northern Ireland had, characteristically, taken the populist 
form of defence of small local schools, rather than focusing on the issues of 
segregation or the quality of education small schools can provide. The Northern 
Ireland secretary had promised full implementation of the review: ‘A Shared Future 
for education is the only way to make Northern Ireland world class and the only way 
to improve standards and ensuring all pupils have the life chances that flow from an 
excellent education.’
172 But he met cross-party opposition, having rejected an 





                                                  
169 R. Wilford and R. Wilson (eds), Northern Ireland Devolution Monitoring Report: January 2007, at 
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10.   Political Parties and Elections   
Rick Wilford and Duncan Morrow  
10.1   Introduction 
In spite of all of the obstacles, Northern Ireland is, once again, on the threshold of 
devolution. Having agreed at St Andrews to move their ‘absolute’ deadline from 24
 
November 2006 to 26 March 2007, and having called an election in January without 
any guarantee that an executive could or would be formed, the governments agreed 
to one last delay at the eleventh hour. Barring unforeseen crisis, however, the 
unthinkable appears to be scheduled for 8 May—a devolved government based on a 
governing partnership between the DUP under the Rev Ian Paisley, the old warhorse 
for evangelical Protestantism, and Martin McGuiness of SF, a leading figure for 
decades in the IRA army council. 
 
There are still many questions, not least the degree to which both parties can 
manage the expectations of their own constituencies and their reflex impulses 
towards historic antagonism and suspicion. Those looking for potential pitfalls can 
find them in policing, parades, social housing, education or cultural policy. The 
political strains of negotiating ‘bread-and-butter’ issues like the distribution of the 
rates/charges burden or the number of councils are not without their own dangers. 
 
But the fact remains that, for whatever combination of reasons, the leaderships of 
organisations historically dedicated to the destruction of the political dreams of their 
opponents have now come to the conclusion that progress is only possible through 
‘permanent’ partnership. The OFMDFM, the joint ministry at the apex of Northern 
Ireland’s unique experiment in consociational power-sharing, has been dubbed the 
‘Office of the Free Presbyterians and the Army Council’. Whatever the final 
outcome—and, as Chou en Lai remarked of the consequences of the French 
revolution, ‘it is too early to tell’—the fact of co-operation between mortal enemies 
without any kind of repartition or land-for-peace segregation is a remarkable British-
Irish diplomatic triumph.  
 
The triumph remains filled with unresolved paradoxes, however. On the threshold of 
power, both SF and the DUP recorded their largest ever share of the Northern Irish 
vote. The politics of ethnic segregation might be said to have won at the ballot box. 
Yet neither party can credibly claim that permanent power-sharing within Northern 
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Ireland, still part of the UK but with special institutional relationships with the rest of 
Ireland, represents a historic ideological triumph. In the battle of ideas, the 
proponents of power-sharing, civil rights, purely peaceful means and British-Irish 
institutional partnership have surely triumphed. But if inter-community power-sharing 
is the sine qua non of government in Northern Ireland, the parties which now make 
the political weather are those historically least dedicated to it.  
 
While the rules of Good Friday 1998 and St Andrews 2006 bind parties together in 
mutual embrace, they also create the potential for deadlock across much of 
government. The times may be less interesting to a sensationalist media, but they 
have got more so for students of war and peace, state-building and institutional 
politics; on all three counts, Northern Ireland is embarking on a fascinating 
institutional experiment. 
10.2  The election campaign 
The question of whether to call an election was itself not finally clarified until the last 
minute. With the DUP refusing to declare itself ready to enter government with SF on 
the appointed date, Dublin was clearly uncertain whether the minimal preconditions 
for holding an election, agreed at St Andrews, had been met. Once more, the risk 
was ultimately taken by the prime minister. When history is written, the role of Tony 
Blair and his quest for a tangible legacy in Northern Ireland must be examined.  
 
The campaign was strangely muted. Perhaps it was the still-dismal time of year; 
more likely, it was a general sense of political weariness. This was the third election 
since 1998 to an assembly which had been in operation in toto for little more than two 
years. In the meantime there were also two general elections, three local elections 
and two European elections.  
 
There was a strong feeling that political momentum lay with the DUP and SF. Not 
only did they enter the election as the strongest parties, but almost all political activity 
since 2005 has been directed at creating consensus between these parties. 
Nonetheless, the DUP was visibly not at one on the issue of going into government 
with SF and faced vocal opposition from its fundamentalist wing in some quarters. SF 
appeared more relaxed following the leadership’s triumph on policing at the party’s 
special ard fheis (see ‘peace process’ section). But the possibility of dissident action 
was a regular refrain. Both parties faced candidates pledged to opposing the new 
orthodoxy of negotiation and possible compromise.  
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The SDLP ran into early trouble when its leader, Mr Durkan, was threatened with 
legal action by a former police chief for claiming that his party had determined the 
appointment of Hugh Orde as chief constable of the new PSNI. But, overall, the party 
ran a competent and confident campaign. The UUP, the dominant force of Ulster 
politics from 1920 until 2003, was still reeling from the splits following the Belfast 
agreement and the disastrous general election of 2005. But the party leadership was 
hopeful that its campaign on economic competence would at least stem the tide. The 
Alliance Party, which retained its six seats in 2003 by the skin of its teeth, was widely 
regarded as vulnerable to a general swing to the margins. In the days before the 
election, knowledgeable commentators predicted a reduction in its representation to 
two or three.  
 
Above all, however, the talk was of the ‘bread-and-butter’ issues, of a disillusionment 
with political polarisation and of the potential for a further decline in turn-out. The 
difficulty remained determining how a vote in Northern Ireland on these issues, 
however salient, could be translated with any degree of certainty into policy outcome. 
 
This time there were 257 candidacies, although the figure is slightly misleading as 
the outgoing North Down UKUP MLA, Robert McCartney, stood in six constituencies, 
‘Rainbow George’ ran in all four Belfast constituencies’ (on a ‘Make Politicians 
History’ platform) and William Frazer, long-time campaigner for victims of republican 
violence, stood in two constituencies as an independent unionist opposed, like Mr 
McCartney, to power-sharing with SF. In effect, there was thus a total of 248 
candidates, the lowest number at the three assembly elections so far.  
 
In addition, there were two fewer women candidates (47) than in both 1998 and 
2003, a drop in part explicable by the absence of the Northern Ireland Women’s 
Coalition, which has ceased to exist as a political party. The proportion of female 
candidates by party (Figure 2) ranged from 40 per cent (SDLP) to just 3 per cent 
(UUP) and, as at all elections since the passage of the Election of Candidates (Sex 
Discrimination) Act 2002, none of the parties took advantage of the opportunity to 
practise positive action in drawing up its candidate lists. 
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Figure 2: Election Candidates by Party and Sex 
 
Party  Women  Men  Women (%)  % change on 2003 
DUP 6  40 13  +3 
UUP 1  37  3  -6 
Alliance 7  11  39  +1 
SF 9 28  24  -8 
SDLP 14  21  40  +23 
Others  10 72* 12  +1 
Total 47  210  18  -1 
 
* Includes multiple candidacies. 
10.3   The results 
Few expected other than the DUP to emerge as the leading party, followed by SF. 
But much hung on the extent of its victory and the degree to which the outcome 
consolidated the leadership of both parties. In the end, the results were relatively 
clear-cut—in relation to radical opponents and the parties which had been their 
electoral ‘big brothers’ for so many decades.  
 
While the disappointment in the SDLP was tangible, given a further decline in the 
party’s performance relative to SF after an apparent stabilisation in 2005, the biggest 
loser in the election was undoubtedly the UUP, which saw its share of the first 
preferences collapse to 14.9 per cent—less than half that of the DUP and even less 
than the party achieved at the last European election. Perhaps even more 
importantly, the DUP out-polled the UUP in 17 of the 18 constituencies and 
eliminated the party entirely from two seats in the north-west. The UUP, once the 
great gathering party of Protestants of every class and hue in Northern Ireland, 
limped back in fourth place—in terms of first preference votes received—still lacking 
any clear policy definition or single-minded purpose.  
 
The post-election defection of the former UUP leader and only prior first minister, 
Lord Trimble, to the Conservatives—however rationalised in terms of the supposed 
completion of his constitutional project of 1998—could not but convey a steadily 
sinking ship. In the last decade, the UUP vote has fallen from 258,349 at the 1997 
general election to just 103,145—a dramatic and probably irreversible decline. 
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Equally, the SDLP’s vote over the same period has dropped from a high point of 
190,814 to its present, almost identical, low of 105,164.  
 
Clearly, the big winners were the DUP and SF, each of which has extended its lead 
over its ethnic rival. The DUP’s proportion of the combined DUP/UUP assembly vote 
reached 66.8 per cent this time—compared with 46 per cent in 1998 and 53 per cent 
in 2003—while SF’s share of the combined SF/SDLP vote rose from 44.5 per cent in 
1998 to 58 per cent in 2003 and reached 63.2 per cent in 2007. For this assembly 
period at least, Northern Ireland now has a new dominant two-party system distinct in 
its institutions and tone from its late twentieth-century variant.  
 
It is difficult to see how either the UUP or the SDLP can recover such lost ground in 
the absence of greater electoral and political definition, or of a broad dissatisfaction 
with the government performance of the two dominant parties. Already there is talk in 
SDLP circles of formal union with Fianna Fáil in the autumn—as with Lord Trimble’s 
move to the British Tories, evidence of how political polarisation is even driving the 
‘moderate’ parties towards their perceived national ‘homes’. Lord Trimble said he 
wanted ‘to persuade the Ulster Unionist Party, and others, to integrate themselves 
more fully into British politics’.
174
 
Figure 3: Results, Seats, First Preference Votes, Vote Share 
 
Party  Seats  Seats +/-  Votes (N)  Votes (%)  +/- % 
DUP 36  +6  207,721  30.1  +4.4 
SF 28 +4  180,573  26.2  +2.6 
UUP 18  -9  103,145  14.9  -7.7 
SDLP 16  -2  105,164  15.2 -1.8 
Alliance 7  +1 36,139 5.2  +1.6 
Green Party  1  +1  11,985  1.7  +1.4 
PUP 1  0  3.822  0.6  -0.6 
Others 1*  0 31,312  4.5  +1.3 
UKUP 0  -1  10,452  1.5 +0.7 
Valid Vote      690,313  63.0  -0.1 
Turnout    696,538  63.5 -0.5 
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The clarity of the overall result hides important local and social variations. In general 
terms, the election represented a further segregation of voting in Northern Ireland. 
Bearing in mind that each of the eighteen STV constituencies has six seats, SF took 
five in West Belfast and three each in Mid-Ulster, West Tyrone and Newry & Armagh. 
Half of the party’s representation in the assembly comes from those four 
constituencies. The DUP took nineteen seats from six constituencies, winning four in 
Strangford and three each in Lagan Valley, North Antrim, East Belfast, East 
Londonderry and East Antrim.  
 
The SDLP consolidated its vote in two of its three Westminster constituencies: Foyle 
(where it achieved a swing against SF) and South Belfast (where it achieved its 
biggest positive swing of 3.9 per cent). The result in South Down, where SF is now 
within breathing distance of becoming the larger party—and for which the SF 
education minister, Ms Ruane, and the SDLP minister for social development, Ms 
Ritchie, will be engaging in an electoral beauty contest while in government 
together—makes the future of that constituency look less secure. 
 
While some of this reflects the importance of name recognition and party 
organisation across many constituencies, some may be due to variable social trends. 
Across rural and small-town constituencies, there was a clear drift towards SF and 
the DUP. The same was generally true in urban or suburban areas with a strong 
working-class representation, such as North and West Belfast, Upper Bann, 
Strangford and South and East Antrim.  
 
Yet in urban and suburban areas with strong middle-class elements, such as North 
Down, South Belfast and East Belfast, there was a (perhaps) surprising consolidation 
of the political centre. In South Belfast the Alliance Party and the SDLP were the 
primary beneficiaries of the absence of the Women’s Coalition, leading to the election 
of Anna Lo, the first Hong Kong born MLA in Northern Ireland, for Alliance at the 
expense of Esmond Birnie of the UUP. In East Belfast, the DUP gained a seat while 
losing first-preference votes, largely as a result of a strong swing from the UUP to 
Alliance.  
 
In North Down, Mr McCartney’s political career came to an end, with most of his 
votes switching towards the DUP. The collapse in the UUP vote and the rise of the 
Green Party, which took Mr McCartney’s vacant seat, suggests that Sylvia Hermon’s 
tenure as sole UUP MP now depends on persuading Alliance and Green voters she 
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is sufficiently moderate to attract their tactical support. The one exception to this drift 
to the centre in middle-class suburbia was in Lagan Valley, where Jeffrey Donaldson 
underlined the extent to which his defection from the UUP has changed the terms of 
trade in this traditional bastion of Unionist respectability. 
 
Amid the party results, there were personal achievements. Mitchel McLaughlin’s 
decision to move from his native Derry to stand in South Antrim paid off spectacularly 
when he topped the poll. In general, the leading figures of SF and the DUP were 
returned with ease. More unnervingly, the SF team in West Belfast has now 
established such discipline in its voters that fewer than 500 votes separated four of 
its five candidates. Alasdair McDonnell (South Belfast) and Mr Durkan performed 
creditably for the SDLP and David Ford and Naomi Long of Alliance were rewarded 
for hard work and persistence by greatly increased votes.  
 
Tellingly, there were few real personal successes for the UUP, although Danny 
Kennedy did better than most in Newry & Armagh. Among the other notable personal 
achievements were the election of Dawn Purvis as the sole Progressive Unionist 
Party candidate in East Belfast and the re-election of independent hospital 
campaigner Dr Kieran Deeny in West Tyrone, who took his seat at the expense of 
the SDLP. 
10.4   The aftermath 
Up until the end, Mr Paisley kept everyone guessing. Without formally acknowledging 
the decision to go into government, the DUP sought to press the Treasury into a new 
transitional ‘peace dividend’. But, with an eye to his own succession and the Scottish 
and Welsh elections—matters on which unionists prove remarkably ignorant—
Gordon Brown proved a tough interlocutor (see finance section).  
 
Ultimately, the DUP sought its own choreography. Seeking to head off a party revolt, 
it announced that it would not establish a government on 26 March, as timetabled. 
Instead—though to what purpose remains opaque—Mr Paisley announced that the 
party would go into government in May. Not seeking to look a gift horse in the mouth, 
the governments swallowed their pride and the new timetable once it became clear 
that SF was prepared to accept a copper-fastened deal for May rather than an 
unseemly collapse in March. 
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SF’s reward on 26 March was a news conference in which Mr Paisley appeared to 
throw away the script of 50 years (see media section). He and Mr Adams confirmed 
that a new government would be established on 8 May, and work on a Programme 
for Government would begin immediately. 
 
The change in mood music was tangible. While no new policy agreements were 
reached, Mr Paisley, clearly learning from Lord Trimble, did not prevaricate. Smiling 
photo-shots were arranged, the joint letter to the secretary of state asking him to 
vacate his office was signed with Mr McGuiness and the hearty handshake with Mr 
Ahern was arranged for the cameras. Alone among senior DUP figures, Jim Allister, 
the party’s MEP, resigned in protest. Members in Mr Paisley’s own North Antrim 
constituency seemed most disillusioned, as six councillors resigned.  But while some 
in the DUP clearly harboured reservations, party unity held impressively.  
 
Co-operation was sufficient to allow for posts to be allocated by the d’Hondt 
proportional mechanism (see ‘peace-process’ section). With key issues such as the 
comprehensive spending review, the review of public administration, selection in 
schools and the introduction of water charges pending (see public-policies section), 
the executive will be tested early. 
10.5   Conclusion 
Prior to this period, the overarching question was whether a sustainable 
constitutional structure could be established in an atmosphere of political antagonism 
and mistrust. In the short run, that question has been definitively answered. The 
rhetoric of the moment of is of shared, peaceful and equal futures. It will take some 
time to test. 
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11.   Public Policies    
Robin Wilson 
11.1   A crowded in-tray 
During the election campaign, it was made clear by ministers that failure to restore 
devolution would mean that the Northern Ireland secretary, Mr Hain, and his southern 
counterpart, Dermot Ahern, would press ahead with the ‘joint stewardship’ of 
Northern Ireland and implement a battery of unpopular measures, including water 
charges, the ending of academic selection and implementation of the seven-council 
model for local authorities. In the event, these and other controversial matters will fall 
to the incoming regional ministerial ‘team’.
 
The most controversial promises to be the future of the transfer test. The head of the 
Queen’s University Graduate School of Education, Prof Tony Gallagher, warned in 
January of ‘chaos’ if devolution returned and the politicians could not agree, with 
selection due to be abolished in 2008.
175 But an assembly sub-group on admissions 
to post-primary schools could not arrive at a consensus before the election.
176
 
The new education minister, as under the previous period of devolution, will be an SF 
representative—this time Ms Ruane, infamous in unionist eyes for her leading role in 
campaigning for the three republicans eventually convicted in absentia, after they 
had gone on the run, of assisting FARC guerrillas in Colombia. Scrutinising Ms 
Ruane will be Sammy Wilson of the DUP, who was allocated the chair of the 
education committee in the assembly doubtless with that in mind. Mr Wilson insisted 




The trouble is that while, legally, the ‘11+’ has gone, academic selection per se has 
not. So the nightmare scenario is of schools developing their own admissions 
policies, with most Catholic schools complying with the arrangements for transfer 
guided by ‘pupil profile’ but controlled and voluntary (ie mainly Protestant) grammar 
schools developing a variety of procedures to select by perceived academic ability, 
for which somehow primary schools must prepare their children. 
                                                  
175 K. Torney, ‘New challenge over exam grades’, Belfast Telegraph (17 January, 2007). 
176 Politicians still miles apart over 11-plus replacement’, Belfast Telegraph (25 January, 2007). 
177 ‘New Assembly cabinet takes shape’, BBC News Online (2 April 2007). 
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The second obvious trial of strength will be over the Irish language. Having held a 
consultation on legislation to follow the commitment made to that effect at St 
Andrews, the culture minister, Ms Eagle, kicked for touch with just 13 days to go until 
26 March. She told the Commons there would be a further consultation and that the 
assembly could decide on the issue if the executive was established. Unsurprisingly, 
the initial consultation had met a response polarised between nationalist advocates 
of rights-based legislation and unionists opposed to any legislation at all; the 




It was undoubtedly with this in mind that, when the d’Hondt rule was indicatively run 
(see devolved-government section), the DUP selected the small Department of 
Culture, Arts and Leisure, as the UUP had done in 1999. And when the party 
announced who would take up the positions, Edwin Poots was named as the putative 
DCAL minister, despite—as he readily confessed—having no expertise in the 
cultural/arts arena. His party leader, Mr Paisley, had meanwhile insisted the DUP 
would veto any Irish-language legislation.
179 It can safely be predicted that, if so, this 
would be interpreted by SF as a breach of the St Andrews agreement and an issue 
the party would raise with Dublin and London, over the heads of its executive 
colleagues. 
 
Ironically, it can be assumed there would be far less inter-party conflict over the 
minor issue of economic policy. In January, the finance minister, Mr Hanson, 
launched for consultation the regional economic strategy requested by the Treasury 
in 2004.
180 The document follows the orthodox (New Labour) Treasury regional 
agenda, with the emphasis on infrastructure, skills, innovation and research and 
development, based on the claim that the macroeconomic goal is stability (rather 
than regional redistribution) and the microeconomic goal is ‘reform’ to allow markets 
to clear (rather than developing regional agglomerations). It thus assumes that 
poorer regions can effectively bootstrap themselves to bridge the gap with the 
wealthier ones.
181  
                                                  
178 DCAL news release, 13 March 2007. 
179 N. McAdam, ‘Republicanism “is being strengthened by DUP quitters”’, Belfast Telegraph (3 April 
2007). 
180 Department of Finance and Personnel [note not DETI], Northern Ireland Draft Regional Economic 
Strategy (Belfast: DFP, 2007, at: www.ireland.com/focus/2007/NDP/index.pdf).  
181 ibid., p. 14. 
73 Northern Ireland Devolution Monitoring Report                                                           April 2007 
 
It does get right the fact that the Celtic Tiger in the republic has been a product of 
many factors, and not just low corporation tax.
182 And it does address north-south co-
operation, though constrained by the same principle applied to the domestic 
economy—ie only intervene where there is ‘market failure’.
183 But given its ultimate 
Treasury provenance it is weak on the specific Northern Ireland challenge of 
sectarian division, despite the evidence from the US of a link between regional 
economic performance and tolerance of cultural diversity.
184
 
None of the parties made any public issue of this, arguably the most important factor 
determining the lives of their constituents day to day. All, including SF which once 
had radical pretensions, have bought into the tax-cutting, pro-business agenda. 
11.2  Done and dusted 
A number of other public-policy issues were moved to the out-tray in advance of the 
prospective renewal of devolution. As education minister, Ms Eagle banned the sale 
of goods high in fat, salt or sugar, as well as sugary fizzy drinks, from schools as of 
the next academic year.
185
 
Interestingly, while debate raged in Britain about Catholic adoption agencies and gay 
parents, the position was different in Northern Ireland because the regulations 
requiring agencies to comply with non-discrimination had been introduced on 1 
January and a wider adoption review had been announced by the social-services 
minister, Mr Goggins. It seems inconceivable that this would have got through a 
devolved assembly, however, given the scale of evangelical-Protestant, as well as 
some Catholic, opposition it would have faced. Homosexuality was only 
decriminalised in Northern Ireland (and in the republic) as a result of a case taken to 
the European Court of Human Rights. 
 
With the 7 March election looming, as in 2005 there was a rush of pre-‘purdah’ 
announcements by ministers. The Northern Ireland secretary, Mr Hain, announced 
that statutory minimum holidays in the region were to be extended to 30 days, 
                                                  
182 ibid., pp. 15-16. 
183 ibid., p. 31. 
184 R. Florida, The Rise of the Creative Class—and how it’s transforming work, leisure, community and 
everyday life (New York: Basic Books, 2002). 
185 DE news release, 26 January 2007. 
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including 10 bank holidays, two days more than in the rest of UK;
186 the DUP MP for 
Lagan Valley, Mr Donaldson, accused him of electioneering with an eye to the 
Labour deputy-leadership contest.
187 The minister for social development, Mr 
Hanson, announced charities legislation which would finally establish a charities 
commission and register of charities in Northern Ireland.
188 And, along with the health 
minister, Mr Goggins, he published a strategy to tackle sexual violence, including a 
plan for a sexual assault referral centre, like others in England and Wales.
189
 
After the election, Mr Goggins opened a consultation on a detailed strategy to 
ameliorate the situation of children in care (of whom there are more than 2,400 in 
Northern Ireland), aiming to reduce by one-fifth those in care and to double the 
proportion of care-leavers in education, training and employment at age 19.
190 And in 
his last such statement as health minister, he was able to trumpet the achievement 
that there was no longer anyone in Northern Ireland waiting more than six months for 
surgery or their first outpatient appointment—compared with 6,500 and 74,000 
respectively a year earlier.
191
 
Indeed, he set new targets of no one waiting more than 21 weeks for surgery and 13 
weeks for that first appointment by March 2008—under the devolved administration, 
of course. Given how waiting lists rose inexorably in the prior period of devolution—to 
become the longest in Europe, the BBC Northern Ireland health correspondent 
charged—this could be challenging. 
 
Finally, his environment colleague, Mr Cairns, backed a controversial major retail 
development at Sprucefield, outside Belfast.
192 This followed a judicial review 
quashing the original decision to that effect by the then environment minister, Lord 
Rooker, which the latter had described as a ‘no brainer’ on the grounds that it 
represented a £100 million investment creating 2,000 jobs. Yet Mr Cairns’ 
announcement flew in the face of the sustainable-development strategy published in 
2006, in for example providing for a 1,250-space multi-storey car park at the 
complex. A series of out-of-town shopping developments in recent years have 
seriously impoverished the ecology of retailing within the city itself. 
                                                  
186 NIO news release, 29 January 2007. 
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